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JURISDICTION 
The a u t h o r i t y b e l i e v e d to c o n f e r jurisdiction on 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to hear this appeal 
is A r t i c l e V I I I , S e c t i o n 4 of the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n ; 
§78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as a m e n d e d ) ; and, R u l e 3 ( a ) , 
S u p r e m e Court Rules. The Supreme Court, acting pursuant to 
Rule 4A, S u p r e m e Court R u l e s , t r a n s f e r r e d this appeal to 
this Court by Order dated April 11, 1988. 
DETERMINITIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES 
There are no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules, or r e g u l a t i o n s w h o s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is 
believed to be determinative of the outcome of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents, Paul H. Richins ("Richins"), Richtron, 
I n c . ("Richtron, I n c . " ) , R i c h t r o n Financial C o r p o r a t i o n 
("Richtron F i n a n c i a l " ) , and R i c h t r o n General ("Richtron 
G e n e r a l " ) ( c o l l e c t i v e l y , the "Richins P a r t i e s " ) 1 , accept 
generally the statement of the case set forth by a p p e l l a n t , 
John P. Sampson ("Sampson"). However, the proper determina-
tion of this appeal requires S a m p s o n ' s s t a t e m e n t to be 
clarified and supplemented in several important respects. 
First, as Sampson accurately s t a t e s , the original 
c o m p l a i n t in this case was filed in the name of Robert J. 
Osborn ("Osborn") for the ostensible purpose of enforcing in 
the State of Utah a judgment obtained by Osborn (the "Osborn 
J u d g m e n t " ) against the Richins P a r t i e s in the S t a t e of 
O r e g o n . H o w e v e r , Sampson fails to state that the Osborn 
Judgment was one of the many l i t i g a t i o n m a t t e r s for which 
the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s retained S a m p s o n to p r o t e c t their 
interests (R. 2079, 2083; Exhibits 64 and 6 7 ) ; that rather 
R i c h t r o n , Inc., Richtron General and Richtron Financial 
will sometimes hereinafter be referred to c o l l e c t i v e l y 
as the "Richtron Companies." 
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than n e g o t i a t i n g a c o m p r o m i s e d s e t t l e m e n t of the O s b o r n 
J u d g m e n t as r e q u e s t e d by the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s , S a m p s o n 
p u r c h a s e d in his own name the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t for the 
purpose of b r i n g i n g suit against his f o r m e r c l i e n t s , the 
R i c h i n s P a r t i e s (R. 2 0 5 0 - 5 1 , 2 0 5 8 - 5 9 ) ; that a f t e r the 
Richins Parties were served with the summons and c o m p l a i n t 
in this case, they learned from Osborn that he had previous-
ly sold the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t to S a m p s o n and a s s e r t e d no 
f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t in the j u d g m e n t (R. 2 0 5 1 ) ; that upon 
discovering that fact, the Richins Parties moved to d i s m i s s 
the a c t i o n on the basis that it was not being prosecuted in 
the name of the real party in interest J_d.; that in response 
to that m o t i o n , S a m p s o n a d m i t t e d that he had acquired the 
Osborn Judgment and was indeed the real party in i n t e r e s t 
Id.; and, that the p r i m a r y p u r p o s e for w h i c h S a m p s o n 
purchased the Osborn Judgment was to preserve claims against 
his former clients in his ongoing efforts to take control of 
the t w e n t y - f i v e l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p s in w h i c h e i t h e r 
R i c h t r o n , Inc. or R i c h t r o n General was the sole general 
p a r t n e r ( c o l l e c t i v e l y , the " L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s " ) (R. 
2 0 5 8 - 5 9 ) . 
In a d d i t i o n , it is i m p o r t a n t to u n d e r s t a n d that 
during the summer of 1982, Sampson was in f r e q u e n t c o n t a c t 
with the United States Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") 
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for the p u r p o s e of providing it with information regarding 
the internal structure and b u s i n e s s a f f a i r s of his f o r m e r 
c l i e n t s , the Rich ins P a r t i e s . ( E x h i b i t s 298 and 3 0 0 ) . 
With that assistance, the IRS conducted a public a u c t i o n in 
O c t o b e r , 1982 to sell a number of a s s e t s of the Richtron 
Companies (R. 2125-26 ) . S a m p s o n , a p p e a r i n g on b e h a l f of 
several investors in the Limited Partnerships, submitted the 
h i g h e s t bid and t h e r e b y apparently^ acquired substantially 
all of the a s s e t s of the Richtron Companies. !£. Shortly 
t h e r e a f t e r , Sampson issued a threat to the Richins Parties' 
legal counsel that u n l e s s counsel p e r m a n e n t l y c e a s e d his 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , Sampson would seek "sanctions" and unspeci-
fied "other" relief against him. (R. 2131-32, 2 2 3 1 - 3 2 ) . The 
district court concluded that Sampson's threat was "bizarre" 
and constituted "unprofessional conduct." Id. 
N e x t , in his s t a t e m e n t , S a m p s o n a p p e a r s to take 
s u b s t a n t i a l c o m f o r t from the fact that the d i s c i p l i n a r y 
c o m m i t t e e of the Utah S t a t e Bar Association issued only a 
private reprimand against him for his conduct in this c a s e . 
He a s s e r t s that a " . . . m o r e s e v e r e penalty was unwarranted 
A f t e r the IRS s a l e , the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s s o u g h t and 
obtained from the United States D i s t r i c t Court for the 
D i s t r i c t of Utah in proceedings entitled Richtron, Inc. 
e t . al . v. John P. S a m p s o n , et . a!., an order voiding 
the sale on the g r o u n d s that the IRS failed to comply 
with several r e q u i r e m e n t s g o v e r n i n g the sale of the 
taxpayer's assets . 
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s i n c e in the c o m m i t t e e ' s o p i n i o n there was no dishonesty, 
d e c e i t or bad m o t i v e . . . " ( B r i e f , p . 4 ) . O b v i o u s l y , no 
portion of the committee's proceedings is, or has ever been, 
a part of the record on which the district court entered its 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment. And, the 
statutory inability of the Richins P a r t i e s to c o n f r o n t and 
cross-examine Sampson in those disciplinary proceedings, and 
thereby elucidate the n u a n c e s of his e t h i c a l l y p r o s c r i b e d 
c o n d u c t , e x t i n g u i s h e s the p r o b a t i v e value, if any, of the 
committee's conclusions. 
F i n a l l y , d e s p i t e the fact that Sampson is seeking 
this court's review of the factual p r e d i c a t e s on w h i c h the 
d i s t r i c t court based its award of damages, Sampson ordered 
transcripts of the testimony of only 14 of the 23 w i t n e s s e s 
at trial. See Affidavit of John T. Anderson dated September 
1 8 , 1 9 8 7 . He also ordered transcripts of the testimony of 
the Richins Parties' primary witness -- R i c h i n s -- only to 
the extent that that testimony was adduced by Sampson's own 
c o u n s e l . JjK He n o w h e r e d e s i g n a t e d for inclusion in the 
record the 15 hours of direct e x a m i n a t i o n of R i c h i n s by 
R i c h i n s ' legal c o u n s e l . J M . T h u s , Sampson designated for 
i n c l u s i o n in the record the t e s t i m o n y of only some of the 
witnesses whom he called and he t o t a l l y o m i t t e d to i n c l u d e 
the t e s t i m o n y of any of the witnesses called by the Richins 
Parties. 
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Accordingly, this court later prohibited Sampson 
from seeking to designate any additional portions of the 
record. (Brief of Appellants, p. 3 ) . At the oral argument 
on the Richins Parties' renewed motion to dismiss Sampson's 
appeal, Sampson's counsel acknowledged to the court that the 
partial portions of the record timely ordered by Sampson 
were "totally inadequate" to permit meaningful review of the 
judgment Sampson now seeks to have reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Structure And Status Of The Richtron Empire Between 
1973 And May, 1980: The Pre-Sampson Years. 
Between October 1973 and March, 1980, Richins, as 
president of the Richtron Companies established 29 limited 
partnerships for the purpose of acquiring, operating and 
holding for resale farm properties located in the states of 
Utah, Idaho and Oregon. (R. 2 0 6 8 ) . 3 Each of the Limited 
Partnerships was evidenced by a written agreement under 
which either Richtron, Inc. or Richtron General was desig-
nated as the sole general partner. (R. 2068; Exhibit 115). 
The agreements provided in pertinent part that (i) 
the general partner was vested with exclusive authority to 
manage and conduct the affairs of the Limited Partnerships 
(R. 2068-69; Exhibit 1 1 5 ) ; (ii) the limited partners were 
Of those 29 limited partnerships, only 25 were targeted 
for takeover by Sampson; accordingly, no claims were 
asserted in the action with respect to the other 4 
limited partnerships. 
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prohibited from taking part in the conduct or control of the 
Limited Partnerships' affairs JkL; (iii) each of the limited 
p a r t n e r s was r e q u i r e d to contribute annually, in cash, to 
the capital of the Limited Partnerships his pro rata share 
of the funds n e c e s s a r y to pay the annual e x p e n s e s of the 
L i m i t e d Partnerships U±.; (iv) the Limited Partnerships had 
a designated term of the earlier of (a) twenty years, or (b) 
the withdrawal of the general p a r t n e r , the d i s t r i b u t i o n , 
sale or abandonment of all Limited Partnership assets or the 
affirmative vote of not less than a majority in i n t e r e s t of 
the limited partners to remove the incumbent general partner 
and elect a new general partner JUi.; and, (v) the primary 
asset of each of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s c o n s i s t e d of 
agricultural property p u r c h a s e d on c o n t r a c t by one of the 
Richtron Companies and resold to the Limited Partnerships at 
a disclosed profit. (Brief, pp. 7, 8; R. 2 2 6 8 ) . 
During the seven year period in which the Richtron 
Companies m a n a g e d and operated the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s , 
none of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s 1 property was ever fore-
closed u p o n . (R. 2 1 2 8 - 2 9 , 2 1 5 7 - 5 8 , 2 2 2 8 ) . In late May, 
1980, Sampson and two of his limited partner clients offered 
to purchase the capital stock of the Richtron C o m p a n i e s for 
$700,000.00. (R. 2049, 2077-78, 2 1 4 1 ) . Accordingly, as the 
district court concluded: 
As f l o u n d e r i n g as the partnerships were, 
Sampson saw value [of at least 
$ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ] t h e r e and spent what now 
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t o t a l s six years in achieving what he now 
has, whatever it may b e , l e a v i n g R i c h i n s 
and his companies with no tangible assets 
or values. 
(R. 2 2 7 5 ) . 
B. Some Of The Limited Partners Begin To Stop Paying Their 
Assessments. 
D u r i n g 1979 and early 1 9 8 0 , many of the limited 
partners refused to pay a s s e s s m e n t s m a d e by t h e i r general 
p a r t n e r ( R i c h t r o n , I n c . or R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l ) . (R. 2 1 0 1 ) . 
Accordingly, Richtron, Inc. and R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l , a l t h o u g h 
under no obligation to do so, made substantial loan advances 
to the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s for the p u r p o s e of s a t i s f y i n g 
d e l i n q u e n t and c u r r e n t land c o n t r a c t i n s t a l l m e n t obliga-
t i o n s , i r r i g a t i o n e q u i p m e n t o b l i g a t i o n s , well d r i l l i n g 
expenses and other operating expenses. (R. 2 1 0 0 ) . By June, 
1980, the aggregate amount of those a d v a n c e s , all of which 
w e r e required by the p a r t n e r s h i p agreements to be repaid, 
exceeded $300,000.00. j_d. 
C. R i c h i n s 1 Good Faith And Low P r o f i l e Efforts To Elicit 
The Cooperation Of The Non-Paying Limited Partners. 
U n d e r the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p a g r e e m e n t s , the 
general partner, R i c h t r o n , I n c . or R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l , had 
the power to terminate the interests of any limited partners 
who failed to pay t h e i r pro rata p o r t i o n of the L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p s ' o p e r a t i n g e x p e n s e s . (R. 2 1 0 1 ) . As the 
district court found: 
It a p p e a r s R i c h i n s was reluctant to stir 
up trouble with such defaulting investors, 
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hop ing t i m e would t a k e ca re of t h e 
prob lem, and t h a t the advances made by the 
g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s , though unknown to have 
been made by t he l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s u n t i l 
t he bubb les began b u r s t i n g about May, 
1980, wou ld t a k e care of t h e deb ts and 
expenses u n t i l b e t t e r t imes e v o l v e d . 
(R. 2102) 
D . S a m p s o n B e g i n s I n t e r f e r i n g With The R i c h i n s P a r t i e s ' 
Management And Control Of The Limited Partnerships. 
On May 29, 1980, Richins conducted a meeting of the 
Catlow Valley Farms Limited Partnership at which many of the 
lim i t e d p a r t n e r s w e r e in a t t e n d a n c e . (R. 2103, 2 1 0 7 - 0 8 ) . 
Sampson, who was retained by two of the limited p a r t n e r s to 
e v a l u a t e their interests in that partnership, also attended 
the meeting. (R. 2 0 7 6 - 7 7 ) . After Richins informed those in 
a t t e n d a n c e that two j u d g m e n t s (including the Osborn Judg-
ment) had recently been entered against the Richins Parties, 
Sampson began sowing the seeds of investor discontent: 
His [Sampson's] a c t i o n s t h e r e w e r e a bit 
more than just p r i v a t e l y c o u n s e l i n g his 
two clients, for he not only r e c o m m e n d e d 
to t h o s e at the m e e t i n g and got started 
the m o v e m e n t to have R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l 
file for b a n k r u p t c y u n d e r c h a p t e r 11 
p r o c e e d i n g s , but he also e x p r e s s e d the 
legal o p i n i o n to all present that he did 
not think R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l could keep 
the m a r k - u p equity arising from Richtron 
Financial's resale of the farm property to 
the C a t l o w V a l l e y P a r t n e r s h i p for an 
amount in excess of what it paid for it, 
which was a theme which Sampson repeatedly 
[and erroneously] expressed in the m o n t h s 
and years ahead. 
(R. 2 0 7 6 - 7 7 ) . 
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As set forth b e l o w , S a m p s o n c o n t i n u e d to agitate 
against the interests of the Richins P a r t i e s and g r a d u a l l y 
s e i z e control of the Limited Partnerships through a variety 
of predatory maneuvers. 
1. S a m p s o n ' s T e n u r e As Legal Counsel For The Richins 
Parties And His Betrayal Of Their Trust. 
At a L i m i t e d Partnership meeting on June 26, 1980, 
S a m p s o n and two of his c l i e n t s agreed to p u r c h a s e the 
capital stock of the Richtron Companies for $700,000.00. (R. 
2 0 7 8 ) . At that t i m e , R i c h i n s i n f o r m e d S a m p s o n that he 
a n t i c i p a t e d that several creditors would be filing lawsuits 
a g a i n s t the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s in the near f u t u r e . (R. 
2 0 7 8 - 7 9 ) . S a m p s o n instructed Richins to send him any such 
complaints and told R i c h i n s that he " . . . w o u l d a n s w e r and 
stall them o f f . " _I_d. P u r s u a n t to that u n d e r s t a n d i n g , 
S a m p s o n "...soon b e c a m e involved in handling certain legal 
m a t t e r s for R i c h i n s and his c o m p a n i e s . " (R. 2 0 7 9 ) . 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , S a m p s o n agreed to r e p r e s e n t the R i c h i n s 
Parties and p r o t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s in at least f o u r t e e n 
s e p a r a t e m a t t e r s . (R. 2 0 7 9 - 8 3 ) . After agreeing to answer 
and otherwise take care of those litigation matters, Sampson 
f a i l e d to do so, t h e r e b y a l l o w i n g at least five cases to 
result in the entry of default judgments against the Richins 
Parties. (R. 2 0 8 1 ) . 
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During this same time period -- August, 1980 -- the 
Richins Parties 1 prior legal c o u n s e l , David G i l l e t t e , sent 
S a m p s o n a check in the amount of $ 1 0 , 7 1 3 . 0 0 p a y a b l e to 
Sampson for the account of one of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . 
(R. 2 0 8 2 ) . In the t r a n s m i t t a l l e t t e r a c c o m p a n y i n g that 
check, Mr. Gillette informed Richins that the funds w e r e to 
be used e x c l u s i v e l y for the Catlow Valley Limited Partner-
ship and were to be released to the general p a r t n e r , 
R i c h t r o n , I n c . , a f t e r Sampson and R i c h i n s had f i n a l i z e d 
their arrangements to "work together." JjK However, Sampson 
p r o m p t l y d i s r e g a r d e d t h o s e i n s t r u c t i o n s by endorsing and 
t r a n s f e r r i n g the check to his newly hired farm m a n a g e r , 
Keith Blanch. !£. 
Notably, one of the matters in which Sampson agreed 
to assist the Richins Parties was negotiating a c o m p r o m i s e d 
s e t t l e m e n t of the Osborn Judgment. In that regard, Sampson 
participated with Richins in seeking to negotiate a s e t t l e -
ment of Osborn's claim during a meeting on July 1, 1980. (R. 
2 0 7 9 ) . While the district court found that the "...certain-
ty of the e x i s t e n c e of an attorney/client relation between 
Sampson and Richins during discussions with... O s b o r n . . . is 
by no m e a n s c l e a r , " R. 2079, the record is undisputed that 
one of the files that M r . G i l l e t t e t u r n e d over to S a m p s o n 
for Sampson's attention in August, 1980 was the Osborn file. 
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(R. 2 0 8 3 ; E x h i b i t s 64 and 6 7 ) . That was c o n s i s t e n t with 
Richins 1 understanding. (Exhibit 1 1 8 ) . 
In evaluating the extent to which Sampson's conduct 
deviated from the standard of care customarily imposed upon 
lawyers in the representation of their clients, the district 
court concluded that: 
Sampson's acceptance of the representation 
of defendants in v a r i o u s l a w s u i t s as set 
forth in the f i n d i n g s and his failure to 
answer or o t h e r w i s e r e s p o n d , or to take 
steps for d e f e n d a n t s to obtain other 
counsel and t h e r e b y avoid d e f a u l t s , 
c o n s t i t u t e d n e g l i g e n c e and a f a i l u r e to 
measure up to the s t a n d a r d of care to be 
e x p e c t e d of m e m b e r s of the legal profes-
sion. 
(R. 2 2 0 9 ) . 
2. S a m p s o n ' s S o l i c i t a t i o n , R e c e i p t And W r o n g f u l 
R e t e n t i o n Of Capital C o n t r i b u t i o n s And Crop 
Proceeds. 
B e g i n n i n g in late J u n e , 1980, some of the limited 
partners insisted, and Richins consented, that Sampson serve 
as the r e p o s i t o r y of capital c o n t r i b u t i o n s . (R. 2 1 1 2 ) . 
That m e c h a n i s m was put in place to insure some d e g r e e of 
control over how the funds were s p e n t . l_d_. (R. 2 1 5 0 ) . 
I m p o r t a n t l y , S a m p s o n was in all instances to "...pass the 
funds through to R i c h i n s for p a y m e n t on p r e s s i n g o b l i g a -
t i o n s " of the Limited Partnerships. (R. 2 1 1 2 ) . In classic 
understatement, the district court sardonically observed: 
That plan was not f o l l o w e d to the letter 
and S a m p s o n began p l a c i n g and r e t a i n i n g 
p a r t n e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s in his trust 
accounts at his bank, and p a r t i c u l a r l y so 
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when the settlement agreement [between the 
Richins Parties and the limited p a r t n e r s ] 
was not approved. 
(R. 2 1 5 0 ) . I n deed, the extent to which Sampson deviated 
from the "letter" of the agreement is staggering: from June 
2 7 , 1980 to O c t o b e r 29, 1 9 8 4 , he solicited and received 
approximately $ 1 , 5 2 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 of capital c o n t r i b u t i o n s and 
p r o c e e d s derived from the sale of crops cultivated on the 
Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s ' p r o p e r t i e s . ^ (R. 2 2 6 5 ) . R i chins 
r e p e a t e d l y made demand on Sampson to comply with the 
original a g r e e m e n t by r e l i n q u i s h i n g the proceeds to the 
R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s that were then (and, as the district 
court c o n c l u d e d , a l w a y s ) the sole general p a r t n e r of the 
Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . (R. 2 0 5 6 , 2 2 2 6 ; Exhibits 54, 147, 
161, 162, 163, 179, 182, 184, 188, 195, 196, 198, 2 0 4 , 206, 
2 0 9 ) . 
3. S a m p s o n ' s Repeated Efforts To Stop The Richins 
Parties From Being Repaid Loan Advances. 
In early J u n e , 1 9 8 0 , Sampson informed numerous 
limited partners that the Richins Parties were not entitled 
to the repayment of any loan a d v a n c e s they had previously 
Of that a m o u n t , $ 6 4 5 , 1 0 1 . 3 8 was collected by Sampson 
between June 27, 1980 (the date of his first r e c e i p t ) 
and November 30, 1982 (the date on which he acquired 
certain interests in the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s at an IRS 
public a u c t i o n ) . (R. 2 1 6 8 ) . It is that amount which 
the district court erroneously declined to award to the 
Richtron Companies as set forth in Argument IX, i nfra. 
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made to the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s . (R. 2100-01, 2 1 4 8 ) . He 
"repeatedly" reiterated that statement "both orally and in 
letters." (R. 2 1 4 8 ) . The amount of those advances exceeded 
$300,000.00. (R. 2 1 0 0 ) . As a result of S a m p s o n ' s s t a t e -
m e n t s , the limited p a r t n e r s refused to consent to the 
Limited Partnerships' repayment of the loan advances to the 
Richins Parties (R. 2 1 1 0 - 2 1 1 2 ) . 
A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t result of S a m p s o n ' s statements 
regarding repayment of advances was to prevent c o n s u m m a t i o n 
of an early settlement of the Limited Partnerships' affairs. 
(R. 2 1 1 2 - 1 3 ) . In the words of the district court: 
A major s t u m b l i n g block [to s e t t l e m e n t ] 
was the insistence of a few p a r t n e r s that 
nothing should be paid to R i c h i n s which 
factor, I believe, and so find, was based 
in part upon Sampson's early and repeated 
statements that the partnerships were not 
obligated to repay advances. Id. 
4. Sampson F l o o d s The L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s With Letters 
C r i t i c i z i n g The R i c h i n s P a r t i e s And U r g i n g The 
Limited P a r t n e r s To Insert His C o r p o r a t i o n s As 
General Partner. 
By early D e c e m b e r , 1 9 8 0 , the long h o p e d - f o r 
s e t t l e m e n t b e t w e e n the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s and the limited 
p a r t n e r s had f a l l e n t h r o u g h . (R. 2 1 1 2 ) . At that point, 
Sampson prepared and sent to all of the limited p a r t n e r s of 
the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s a l e t t e r dated December 2, 1980. 
(R. 2119-20; Exhibit 7 ) . That letter sets forth in a s t o n -
ishing detail and with almost p a l p a b l e rage, a plan that 
Sampson and several of the limited p a r t n e r s had c o n c e i v e d 
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to w r e s t control of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s from the 
Richtron Companies. In that letter, S a m p s o n m a d e a number 
of i n f l a m m a t o r y and ultimately destructive recommendations 
to al 1 of the l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s . ^ Among those recommenda-
t i o n s was that the i n v e s t o r s r e f u s e to s e t t l e with the 
Richins Parties; that the i n v e s t o r s not pay any m o n i e s to 
the R i c h i n s Parties; that the investors stop payment on any 
checks previously issued to the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s ; that the 
i n v e s t o r s sue the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s for fraud and breach of 
fiduciary duty; that the investors send all f u r t h e r m o n i e s 
to S a m p s o n , and not the Richins Parties; that the investors 
consent to Sampson inserting his professional corporation as 
s u c c e s s o r general partner of the Limited Partnerships; that 
the investors give t h e i r voting p r o x i e s to S a m p s o n ; and, 
that the investors pay substantial compensation to Sampson, 
id. 
D u r i n g the next three y e a r s , Sampson sent numerous 
letters to the investors in which he denigrated the R i c h i n s 
P a r t i e s and s o u g h t to obtain investor support for his plan 
to seize control of the Limited Partnerships. In so d o i n g , 
It is important to recall that Sampson represented only 
2 of the 130 investors in the Limited Partnerships. (R. 
2 1 4 2 ) . As the d i s t r i c t court c o n c l u d e d with apparent 
exasperation, Sampson "never fully specifically i d e n t i -
f i e d " any of the additional clients whom he purportedly 
represented. (R. 2 1 5 9 ) . 
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S a m p s o n "...had for all practical purposes reduced Richins' 
control in partnership affairs to a letter w r i t i n g r o l e . " 
(R. 2 1 6 1 ) . 
5. Sampson's Acquisition Of The Osborn Judgment. 
I m m e d i a t e l y after sending the D e c e m b e r 2, 1980 
letter, Sampson contacted Osborn and Osborn's legal counsel 
for the purpose of buying the Osborn Judgment. (R. 2 0 5 0 ) . 
T h o s e d i s c u s s i o n s resulted in a J a n u a r y , 1981 a g r e e m e n t 
whereby Osborn agreed to sell the Osborn Judgment to Sampson 
for $40,000.00, $20,000.00 of which was to be paid i m m e d i -
ately and the b a l a n c e of which was to be paid within three 
months. J_d. Accordingly, on January 23, 1981, Sampson sent 
a check in the amount of $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 to O s b o r n ' s legal 
c o u n s e l . JjK Several days l a t e r , counsel transmitted to 
Sampson an assignment of the Osborn Judgment that recited on 
its face that in c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the sum of $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , 
O s b o r n assigned to Sampson personal 1y all of his right, 
t i t l e and interest in and to the Osborn J u d g m e n t . (R. 
2 0 5 0 - 5 2 ) . In a cover letter accompanying that a s s i g n m e n t , 
O s b o r n ' s counsel wished Sampson "good luck on your proceed-
ings against the [Richins P a r t i e s ] . " (Exhibit 1 7 ) . For 
o b v i o u s reasons, Sampson did not inform the Richins Parties 
of that acquisition. (R. 2 0 5 1 ) . 
Both the initial $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 (and the additional 
$45,000.00 that Sampson later paid to Osborn after Sampson 
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d e f a u l t e d in his payment of the required initial install-
ments) were derived from monies paid to Sampson by investors 
in the Limited Partnerships. (R. 2 0 5 0 ) . Sampson's admitted 
p u r p o s e for a c q u i r i n g the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t was for the 
p u r p o s e of p r e s e r v i n g and a s s e r t i n g a claim a g a i n s t the 
Richins Parties by bringing an action t h e r e o n . (R. 2 0 5 9 , 
2 2 0 3 ) . A c c o r d i n g l y , the d i s t r i c t court c o n c l u d e d that 
Sampson's p u r c h a s e of the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t v i o l a t e d Utah 
Code Ann. §78-51-27, which prohibits a lawyer from acquiring 
a " . . . d e m a n d of any kind for the p u r p o s e of b r i n g i n g an 
action thereon..." (R. 2 2 0 2 - 0 3 ) . It further concluded that 
Sampson's dual violations of that s t a t u t e were "a s e r i o u s 
violation of law." (R. 2 1 2 4 ) . 
6. S a m p s o n ' s I n a b i l i t y To Comply With The R e q u i r e -
ments Of Utah Law R e g a r d i n g The Substitution Of A 
S u c c e s s o r General P a r t n e r In The Limited Partner-
shi ps. 
In an e f f o r t to carry out one of the p r i m a r y 
objectives articulated in his December 2, 1980 letter -- to 
substitute his professional corporation as successor general 
p a r t n e r of each of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s -- S a m p s o n 
sought to solicit from each of the limited p a r t n e r s a 
limited power of attorney authorizing S a m p s o n to vote each 
such p a r t n e r ' s i n t e r e s t in the Limited Partnerships. (R. 
2 1 1 9 - 2 0 ) . As the d i s t r i c t court c o n c l u d e d , S a m p s o n ' s 
a t t e m p t e d solicitation of the powers of attorney was one of 
the first steps in S a m p s o n ' s " . . . s i g n i f i c a n t effort to 
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o b t a i n control of all the p a r t n e r s h i p s and to e x c l u d e 
R i c h i n s t h e r e f r o m . " Vd. "This activity [the solicitation 
of the limited p o w e r s of a t t o r n e y ] marks the beginning of 
Sampson's concerted efforts to interfere in each partnership 
b u s i n e s s and to seize and take control t h e r e o f to the 
exclusion of Richins and his companies." Id. 
Relying upon the limited powers of attorney that he 
a c t u a l l y o b t a i n e d , S a m p s o n p u r p o r t e d to elect his own 
p r o f e s s i o n a l corporation, John P. Sampson, P.C., as succes-
sor general partner of each of the Limited Partnerships. (R. 
2 1 5 2 - 5 3 ) . However, he was soon informed by the court of the 
self-evident fact that under the Utah Professional C o r p o r a -
tion A c t , p r o f e s s i o n a l corporations were and are precluded 
from operating businesses other than t h o s e for w h i c h they 
are s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r m e d . (R. 2 1 5 4 ) . In o t h e r w o r d s , 
Sampson's professional corporation organized for the express 
purpose of practicing law could not be utilized as an entity 
engaged in the management of agricultural enterprises. Id. 
The d i s t r i c t court then a d r o i t l y s u m m a r i z e d the 
numerous steps and a t t e m p t e d c o r r e c t i v e m e a s u r e s S a m p s o n 
u n d e r t o o k to insert his other corporation, Ag-Management, 
as successor general p a r t n e r of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s . 
(See , R. 2 1 2 0 - 2 1 2 3 ) . The m a n n e r in which t h o s e m u l t i p l e 
e f f o r t s ran afoul of the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the Utah Uniform 
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L i m i t e d Partnership Act contained in §48-1-1 et. seq., Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) is set forth at R. 2121-23 and 2151-52. 
In November, 1982, Richins sought and obtained in a 
related state court proceeding entitled Blackfoot Farms, et. 
a l . v. Paul H. R i c h i n s , et. a!., (Second Judicial District 
C o u r t of D a v i s C o u n t y , Utah, Civil No. 30994) a determina-
tion that S a m p s o n ' s v a r i o u s e f f o r t s to s u b s t i t u t e his 
c o r p o r a t i o n s as s u c c e s s o r general p a r t n e r of the Limited 
Partnerships did not comply with the Utah U n i f o r m L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p A c t . (R. 2 1 2 4 - 2 5 ) . In making that determina-
t i o n , the court e n t e r e d d e t a i l e d f i n d i n g s of fact and 
c o n c l u s i o n s of law that the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s w e r e , and 
always had been, the sole authorized general partners of the 
Limited Partnerships.^ 
7. Sampson's Cooperation With The IRS As An Additional 
Vehicle For Dismembering The Richins Parties. 
D u r i n g 1 9 8 2 , and while simultaneously pursuing the 
conduct described a b o v e , S a m p s o n also c o m m u n i c a t e d freely 
with the IRS in s e e k i n g to a s s i s t it in i d e n t i f y i n g and 
describing various assets owned by the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s . 
(Exhibits 298 and 300) . 
In the p r e s e n t c a s e , J u d g e C r o f t d e c l i n e d to accord 
p r e c l u s i v e e f f e c t to the Blackfoot Farms judgment, but 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , with only one exception, reached the same 
result Judge Palmer did in the Blackfoot Farms case. 
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Shortly t h e r e a f t e r , on O c t o b e r 29, 1982, the IRS 
conducted a public auction for the p u r p o s e of s e e k i n g to 
sell the v a r i o u s a s s e t s of the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s . (R. 
2 1 2 5 - 2 6 ) . S a m p s o n , as the only b i d d e r at that s a l e , 
p u r p o r t e d to a c q u i r e the R i c h t r o n A f f i l i a t e s 1 a s s e t s . 
id.7 
8. S a m p s o n ' s O n g o i n g S o l i c i t a t i o n And Use Of Monies 
From Some Of The Limited P a r t n e r s Of The Limited 
Partnershi ps. 
From J u n e , 1980 to N o v e m b e r , 1982 (just after the 
IRS sale at which S a m p s o n p u r p o r t e d to a c q u i r e w h a t e v e r 
i n t e r e s t the Richtron Companies had in the Limited Partner-
s h i p s ) , Sampson s o l i c i t e d , received and d i s b u r s e d "...at 
least $ 6 4 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 from and for the limited p a r t n e r s and 
their partnerships." (R. 2 1 2 3 ) . In doing so, he d i r e c t e d 
the i n v e s t o r s to send the m o n i e s to "...him and not to 
R i c h i n s . " ^d.-8 F r o m N o v e m b e r , 1982 to O c t o b e r , 1 9 8 4 , 
S a m p s o n received an a d ditional $ 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , resulting in 
total receipts for the four and o n e - h a l f year period of 
As indicated at n. 2, s u p r a , that sale w a s , at the 
i n s t a n c e of the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s , later voided by the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah. 
I n d e e d , Sampson's solicitation of monies from investors 
in the Limited Partnerships was shockingly d i r e c t . For 
e x a m p l e in a letter dated J a n u a r y 7, 1981 sent to all 
investors, Sampson stated: "...since we are now taking 
over all of the p a r t n e r s h i p s would you please make all 
t h o s e p a y m e n t s [ a s s e s s m e n t s p r e v i o u s l y made by the 
Richtron Companies] to me." Exhibit 183. 
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a p p r o x i m a t e l y $1,522,000.00. (R. 2 2 6 5 ) . Thus, during that 
period of t i m e , " . . . S a m p s o n had taken over and assumed 
control of the twenty-five partnerships, and he was receiv-
ing all of the f u n d s , d i s b u r s i n g them and using them in 
w h a t e v e r way he d e t e r m i n e d . He continued such control for 
five years, yet produced no evidence as to what had happened 
to t h o s e p a r t n e r s h i p s . " (R. 2 1 5 8 ) . His use of those 
partnership funds was determined by the district court to be 
" u n a u t h o r i z e d " b e c a u s e the Richtron Companies "...remained 
general p a r t n e r with c o m p l e t e control over p a r t n e r s h i p 
a f f a i r s . " (R. 2 2 3 6 ) . So long as Sampson failed to lawfully 
install his corporations as successor general partner of the 
Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s , he had "no legal a u t h o r i t y to make 
such decisions regarding partnership assets." (R. 2 0 5 6 ) . 
N o t a b l y , from the moment the federal court voided 
the IRS tax sale on May 16, 1984 (R. 2 1 5 7 ) , the legal 
a b i l i t y of Sampson and his limited p a r t n e r c l i e n t s to 
undertake any further efforts to wind up the affairs of any 
of the Limited Partnerships "...ended then and there." (R. 
2 2 3 1 ) . However, even after the entry of that o r d e r , the two 
bank a c c o u n t s u t i l i z e d by S a m p s o n -- the Ag M a n a g e m e n t 
account and the Consolidated Farms account -- had a b a l a n c e 
of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $289,000.00. (R. 2229, 2244, 2263, 2 2 7 6 ) . 
That amount, all of which legally belonged to Richtron, Inc. 
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and R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l , is g r e a t e r than the a m o u n t of 
consequential damages awarded to Richtron, Inc. and Richtron 
General . (R. 2 2 7 8 ) . 
9. Sampson's Concealment Of His Predatory Conduct. 
S a m p s o n b o a s t e d in a letter sent to all investors 
that he had creatively concealed from the Richins Parties --
his own f o r m e r c l i e n t s -- the financial information neces-
sary to trace his use of the Limited Partnerships' funds: 
I w a n t e d him [ R i c h i n s ] to spend all his 
time occupied at doing s o m e t h i n g , t r y i n g 
to f i g u r e out what we had d o n e . I have 
always known that if he went t h r o u g h the 
p r o p e r p r o c e d u r e s in court he could get 
the information. I simply w a n t e d him to 
spend the t i m e and m o n e y to do it. 
(Exhibit 8 8 ) . 
E. General Overview Of Case. 
The district court cogently summarized its decision 
as follows: 
The record in summary thus shows that in 
May, 1980, Richins and his c o m p a n i e s had 
control of at least t w e n t y - f i v e limited 
farm partnerships with assets and liabili-
ties of such a n a t u r e that they had 
serious financial p r o b l e m s in M a y , 1 9 8 0 , 
when S a m p s o n first b e c a m e i n v o l v e d . It 
further shows that when Sampson first got 
involved he had nothing in the twenty-five 
p a r t n e r s h i p s except two c l i e n t s that 
w a n t e d a d v i c e . By S a m p s o n ' s act and 
conduct by the end of 1980 -- within seven 
m o n t h s -- S a m p s o n had t a k e n over and 
assumed control of the t w e n t y - f i v e 
partnerships, that he was receiving all of 
the funds, disbursing them and using them 
in whatever way he determined. 
... 
S a m p s o n s u g g e s t e d from time to time that 
his sole o b j e c t i v e was to s a l v a g e the 
p a r t n e r s h i p assets for the l i m i t e d 
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p a r t n e r s to the point of at least getting 
back their investments. The evidence does 
not show that all i n v e s t o r s joined in 
r e t a i n i n g S a m p s o n as t h e i r a t t o r n e y or 
their p r o x y , but the e v i d e n c e does make 
c l e a r that Sampson's main goal and effort 
soon b e c a m e one of getting rid of Rich ins 
from all p a r t n e r s h i p s and o b t a i n i n g 
control t h e r e o f for h i m s e l f and his 
c l i e n t s w h o m he never fully specifically 
i d e n t i f i e d * I think the evidence shows, 
and so f i n d , that his s e l f - d e c l a r e d 
b e n e v o l e n t m o t i v e soon changed to one of 
greed and a v e n d e t t a to oust Richins and 
take complete control. 
• • • 
As floundering as the p a r t n e r s h i p s w e r e , 
Sampson saw value there and spent what now 
totals six years in achieving what he now 
h a s , w h a t e v e r it may b e , leaving Richins 
and his companies with no t a n g i b l e a s s e t s 
or values . 
(R. 2158-59, 2275) (Emphasis a d d e d ) . 
F i n a l l y , as the court concluded, "it was problems 
c r e a t e d by R i c h i n s 1 m i s m a n a g e m e n t f o l l o w e d by S a m p s o n ' s 
t o r t i o u s c o n d u c t that b r o u g h t this case to court for a 
decision as to whether any damages are recoverable upon the 
counterclaim." (R. 2 2 7 5 ) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. S a m p s o n i n c l u d e d in the record in this appeal 
only a p o r t i o n of the trial t e s t i m o n y . His s e l e c t i v e 
p r e s e n t a t i o n of only a fragmentary record makes it impossi-
ble for the court to m e a n i n g f u l l y review the j u d g m e n t . 
A b s e n t the m i s s i n g p o r t i o n s of the record, there is no way 
that S a m p s o n can e s t a b l i s h that the d i s t r i c t c o u r t 1 s 
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f i n d i n g s of fact are "clearly e r r o n e o u s " or that the 
judgment be reversed, 
I I . Even ignoring the serious problems created by 
Sampson's failure to i n c l u d e the e n t i r e record on a p p e a l , 
S a m p s o n , like any o t h e r a p p e l l a n t , has the b u r d e n of 
m a r s h a l l i n g all of the e v i d e n c e in support of the trial 
c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and to then d e m o n s t r a t e , that even when 
viewed in the light most f a v o r a b l e to t h o s e f i n d i n g s , the 
evidence is insufficient to support those findings. Because 
S a m p s o n has only n o m i n a l l y sought to m a r s h a l l the trial 
c o u r t ' s f a c t s , he has failed to meet the heavy burden of 
establishing the existence of reversible error. 
I I I . The d i s t r i c t court p r o p e r l y i d e n t i f i e d at 
least twenty-two separate improper m e a n s that S a m p s o n used 
to s e i z e control of the Limited Partnerships and extinguish 
the interest of the Richins Parties. When aggregated, those 
f i n d i n g s e s t a b l i s h i m p r o p e r m e a n s far more e x t e n s i v e and 
serious than those deemed to be a c t i o n a b l e in this c o u r t ' s 
seminal h o l d i n g in Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) . 
IV. The d i s t r i c t court p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e d that 
Sampson's takeover of the Limited Partnerships was a c t u a t e d 
by an i m p r o p e r p u r p o s e . In r e a c h i n g that conclusion, the 
d i s t r i c t court r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r r e d the e x i s t e n c e of an 
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i m p r o p e r p u r p o s e from the e x t e n s i v e series of p r e d a t o r y 
unlawful means utilized by S a m p s o n to take control of the 
Limited Partnerships. 
V. The d i s t r i c t court p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e d that 
Sampson's tortious conduct was the proximate cause of injury 
and d a m a g e s to the Richins Parties. Under the two possible 
tests of proximate cause -- the "substantial factor" test or 
the "but for" test -- S a m p s o n ' s unlawful interference was 
the legal cause of injury and d a m a g e s to the R i c h i n s 
Parti es . 
V I . In a s s e r t i n g that the d i s t r i c t court impro-
perly concluded that the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s did not w a i v e or 
are e s t o p p e d from c o m p l a i n i n g about S a m p s o n ' s c o n d u c t , 
S a m p s o n has failed to m a r s h a l l all e v i d e n c e r e l e v a n t to 
t h o s e f i n d i n g s . T h e r e f o r e , a p p e l l a t e review of Sampson's 
contention cannot be undertaken. 
V I I . The district court's award to Richtron, Inc. 
and Richtron General of consequential damages in the amount 
of $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 and to Richtron Financial and Richtron, Inc. 
of special d a m a g e s in the amount of $ 3 5 , 1 9 7 . 0 0 cannot be 
c h a l l e n g e d in the face of an i n c o m p l e t e r e c o r d . If, 
however, the court elects to overlook the problems posed by 
the i n c o m p l e t e r e c o r d , it is n e v e r t h e l e s s clear that the 
damage awards are consistent with applicable law and have a 
"rational basis" in the record. 
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V I I I . The e v i d e n c e o v e r w h e l m i n g l y e s t a b l i s h e s 
that Sampson's conduct was undertaken with extreme reckless-
n e s s . U n d e r Utah law, that is s u f f i c i e n t to s u p p o r t an 
award of punitive damages. The district court's f a i l u r e to 
do so constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. 
IX. As the s o l e , a u t h o r i z e d general p a r t n e r s of 
the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s , R i c h t r o n , I n c . and R i c h t r o n 
G e n e r a l w e r e the only p a r t i e s e n t i t l e d to receive capital 
contributions from the limited partners and proceeds derived 
from the sale of L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p a s s e t s . S a m p s o n ' s 
u n a u t h o r i z e d r e c e i p t and d i s b u r s e m e n t of m o r e than 
$645,000,00 of such monies renders him l i a b l e to R i c h t r o n , 
Inc. and Richtron General in that amount. 
X. The district court erred in r e f u s i n g to award 
damages to the Richtron Companies for all loan advances they 
m a d e to the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s -- loan a d v a n c e s that 
Sampson repeatedly insisted need not be paid and as a result 
of which were in fact not paid. 
ARGUMENT I 
SAMPSON'S SELECTIVE INCLUSION OF ONLY A 
PORTION OF THE TRIAL TESTIMONY MAKES IT 
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE COURT TO 
MEANINGFULLY REVIEW THE JUDGMENT 
Rule 1 1 ( e ) ( 2 ) , Supreme Court Rules, provides that: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal 
that a f i n d i n g or conclusion is unsuppor-
ted by or is contrary to the e v i d e n c e , he 
shall i n c l u d e in the record a transcript 
of all evidence r e l e v a n t to such f i n d i n g 
or conclusion. 
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This C o u r t has repeatedly held that an appellant's 
failure to ensure the inclusion of the entire t r a n s c r i p t of 
t e s t i m o n y in the record is fatal to a p p e l l a t e review of 
c h a l l e n g e d action by the lower court. In Smith v. Vuicich, 
699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) , the court was confronted with a 
s i t u a t i o n i d e n t i c a l to that in this p r o c e e d i n g : Like 
S a m p s o n , the appellant ordered only a partial transcript of 
the trial consisting e x c l u s i v e l y of her own t e s t i m o n y and 
that of her own witnesses* As the court pointedly observed, 
the appellant had failed to include any of the r e s p o n d e n t ' s 
e v i d e n c e . In a f f i r m i n g the trial c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t , this 
court held that: 
W h e r e the record before us is incomplete, 
we are unable to review the e v i d e n c e as a 
w h o l e and must therefore presume that the 
verdict was s u p p o r t e d by a d m i s s i b l e and 
competent evi dence. 
Id. at 7 6 5 . A c c o rd, S t e v e n s v. S c h w e n d i m a n , 688 P.2d 466 
(Utah 1 9 8 4 ) . 
Similarly, in James Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 15 
Utah 2d 2 1 0 , 390 P.2d 127 ( 1 9 6 4 ) , the a p p e l l a n t sought 
r e v i e w of the trial c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n r e g a r d i n g the 
t i m e l i n e s s of a p p e l l a n t ' s notification of allegedly defec-
tive conditions in c e r t a i n e q u i p m e n t . H o w e v e r , a p p e l l a n t 
d e s i g n a t e d only a portion of the trial testimony on appeal. 
In affirming the trial c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , this court 
held in pertinent part that: 
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P l a i n t i f f argues that t h e r e was not 
sufficient evidence to support defendant's 
c o u n t e r c l a i m and that d e f e n d a n t had not 
notified plaintiff of any alleged d e f e c t s 
in the equipment within a reasonable time. 
However, plaintiff saw fit to include only 
a portion of the t e s t i m o n y in the record 
upon this appeal. Under the circumstances 
it is i m p o s s i b l e for this court to 
properly assess the e n t i r e e v i d e n c e and 
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the trial court was 
correct in de n y i n g these m o t i o n s of the 
p l a i n t i f f . It m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , be 
presumed that the ruling was sup p o r t e d by 
the evidence produced at the trial. 
Id. at 1 2 9 . Accord, First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, of 
Salt Lake City v. S c h a m a n e k , 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) ; Jji 
re V o o r h e e s ' E s t a t e , 12 Utah 2d 3 6 1 , 366 P.2d 977 (1961); 
Sandal! v. Sandall , 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093 (19 2 0 ) . 
This c o u r t ' s i n s i s t e n c e that presentation of the 
entire record underlying the trial court's factual determin-
ations is a condition precedent to review of those determin-
ations is shared by all courts that have c o n s i d e r e d the 
q u e s t i o n . Bliss v. T r e e c e , 658 P.2d 169, 172 (Ariz. 1983) 
("Where the record is i n c o m p l e t e , a reviewing court must 
assume any evidence not a v a i l a b l e on appeal s u p p o r t e d the 
trial court's a c t i o n . " ) ; In the Matter of Dana P. v. State, 
565 P.2d 2 5 3 , 256 (Okla. 1 9 8 2 ) ("In the a b s e n c e of a 
complete record (here, the failure to make a record of the 
t e r m i n a t i o n h e a r i n g ) , the f i n d i n g s of fact and law by the 
trial court are p r e s u m e d to be t r u e . " ) ; Lau v. Nelson, 92 
Wash. 2d 823, 601 P.2d 527, 530 (1979) ("Here, the appellant 
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has b r o u g h t up only a part of the r e c o r d , which does not 
reveal the e v i d e n c e which was placed b e f o r e the jury in 
regard to the circumstances of the accident. Consequently, 
we must assume that there was evidence upon the q u e s t i o n of 
c a u s a t i o n which the jury was c a p a b l e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
without the aid of an expert* We are in no position to say 
that the lower court abused its discretion in excluding this 
opinion testimony and must hold the a s s i g n m e n t of e r r o r to 
be w i t h o u t m e r i t . " ) ; Visco v. Universal Refuse Removal Co., 
11 A r i z . App. 73, 462 P.2d 90, 92 (1969) ("A finding of fact 
cannot be 'clearly e r r o n e o u s 1 if there is s u b s t a n t i a l 
e v i d e n c e to support it. How can this court test whether or 
not there is substantial evidence to support the j u d g m e n t , 
when part of the e v i d e n c e , i n c l u d i n g file n o . 180825, is 
missing? The question a n s w e r s itself - this court cannot 
review the evidence.") 
O b v i o u s l y , an a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e to include the 
e n t i r e trial record m a k e s it i m p o s s i b l e for a r e v i e w i n g 
court to determine whether, in any given case, the appellant 
was the victim of reversible error. As this court c o g e n t l y 
noted in Sawyers v. Sawyers, 588 P.2d 607, 608 (Utah 1 9 7 6 ) : 
Appellate review of factual matters can be 
meaningful, orderly and i n t e l l i g e n t only 
in j u x t a p o s i t i o n to a record by which 
lower c o u r t ' s rulings and d e c i s i o n s on 
disputes can be measured. 
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In the case at bar, Sampson has accurately identi-
fied the primary issue in this case as whether the d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t ' s award of d a m a g e s was p r e m i s e d on " s u b s t a n t i a l 
e v i d e n c e of facts and not by mere c o n c l u s i o n s nor by 
c o n j e c t u r e . " ( D o c k e t i n g S t a t e m e n t , p. 3 ) . H o w e v e r , to 
o b t a i n a p p e l l a t e review of that issue (as well as the 
c o r r e c t n e s s of a variety of "ultimate" facts regarding both 
l i a b i l i t y and d a m a g e s ) , S a m p s o n o f f e r s this court only 
s e l e c t i v e f r a g m e n t s of the t e s t i m o n i a l and d o c u m e n t a r y 
evidence adduced at t r i a l . S p e c i f i c a l l y , he o f f e r s only 
that e v i d e n c e that he b e l i e v e s supports his view that (i) 
there is an insufficient factual basis for damages and (ii) 
t h e r e is little or no logical c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the 
district court's "probative" facts (which Sampson accepts as 
t r u e ) and the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s " u l t i m a t e " facts (which 
Sampson seeks to c h a l l e n g e ) . (Brief, pp. 6, 25) He totally 
i g n o r e s the e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d by nine of the R i c h i n s 
Parties' w i t n e s s e s and s e e k s , in e f f e c t , to s a n i t i z e the 
e v i d e n c e of r e s p o n d e n t s ' main w i t n e s s , Paul R i c h i n s , by 
ordering that testimony only to the extent it was e l i c i t e d 
from S a m p s o n ' s own c o u n s e l . In doing so, S a m p s o n has 
excised from the record extensive t e s t i m o n y crucial to the 
Richins Parties' case. His studiously selective ordering of 
the record prompted his own counsel to a c k n o w l e d g e to this 
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c o u r t t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g r e c o r d on appeal was " t o t a l l y 
i n a d e q u a t e " t o c h a l l e n g e t h e j u d g m e n t , 9 The R ich i ns 
P a r t i e s agree. 
A p p a r e n t l y r e c o g n i z i n g t h e obv ious j e o p a r d y t o 
which h i s appeal i s s u b j e c t e d , Sampson now argues i n h i s 
b r i e f t h a t w i t h " o n l y few e x c e p t i o n s , " he does not con tes t 
the " p r o b a t i v e f i n d i n g s " of the d i s t r i c t cour t and t h e r e f o r e 
has not r e l i e d upon t h e u n d e r l y i n g r e c o r d . . . " ( B r i e f , p. 
2 5 ) . He proposes t o " f o c u s " upon and c h a l l e n g e t h e " u l t i -
mate f a c t s " d e t e r m i n e d by t he d i s t r i c t c o u r t based upon 
" t h e s e p r o b a t i v e f a c t s . " Jk[. a t p p . 6 and 2 5 . And , he 
f r a n k l y acknowledges t h a t h i s c h a l l e n g e t o t h e d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t ' s award of damages i s p remised on bo th a l a c k of 
" e v i d e n t i a r y suppo r t " and " s u f f i c i e n t f i n d i n g s . " ]_dk at p. 
5 . However, as shown b e l o w , Sampson's e f f o r t to save h is 
appeal by asking t h i s cour t to accept as c o r r e c t " e s s e n t i a l -
l y a l l " o f t h e " p r o b a t i v e " or subord ina te f a c t s and r e j e c t 
t h e " u l t i m a t e " f a c t s i s , i n t h e f a c e of an i n c o m p l e t e 
f a c t u a l r e c o r d , u n a v a i l i n g . 
Under Ru le 52 , Utah R. C i v . P . , the d i s t r i c t cour t 
i s , of course , r equ i r ed to " . . . f i n d the f a c t s s p e c i a l l y and 
s t a t e s e p a r a t e l y i t s c o n c l u s i o n s of law t h e r e o n . . . " As a 
general r u l e , " f i n d i n g s s h o u l d be l i m i t e d t o t he u l t i m a t e 
9
 That admission was made at the September 7, 1987 hear ing 
on t h e R i c h i n s P a r t i e s 1 renewed mo t i on t o d i s m i s s 
Sampson's appeal . 
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facts and if they ascertain ultimate facts, and sufficiently 
c o n f o r m to the p l e a d i n g s and e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t the 
judgment, they will be regarded as sufficient, though not as 
full and c o m p l e t e as may be desired." Pearson v. Pearson, 
561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) . However, 
R a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n m a k i n g by the trial 
court r e q u i r e s that the court address and 
r e s o l v e all p e r t i n e n t s u b o r d i n a t e and 
u l t i m a t e factual issues w h i c h must be 
r e s o l v e d on the basis of the e v i d e n c e 
p resented and a p p l i c a b l e rules of l a w . 
This process is even more important to the 
proper functioning of a r e v i e w i n g c o u r t . 
A p p e l l a t e c o u r t s are simply not in a 
position to evaluate and resolve conflict-
ing oral t e s t i m o n y as a c c u r a t e l y as a 
trial court. (Emphasis a d d e d ) . 
R o m r e l l v. Zions First National B a n k , N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 
395 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) . 
T h e r e f o r e , to the e x t e n t the d i s t r i c t court 
addresses and resolves both subordinate and ultimate factual 
i s s u e s , a p p e l l a t e review of their correctness can be based 
only upon resort to the " e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d . " W h e r e , 
h o w e v e r , as in this c a s e , only a selective portion of the 
trial evidence is made a part of the record on appeal, there 
is no p r i n c i p l e d basis on which this Court can accept or 
reject the h u n d r e d s of factual f i n d i n g s of the d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t . In other w o r d s , the absence of the complete record 
renders i m p o s s i b l e any m e a n i n g f u l review of the d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s , regardless of whether those findings are 
characterized as "subsidiary" or "ultimate." 
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There is simply no way S a m p s o n can come remotely 
c l o s e to d i s c h a r g i n g his b u r d e n s of (i) i n c l u d i n g a 
"...transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding...," 
as required by Rule 1 1 ( e ) ( 2 ) , S u p r e m e Court R u l e s , (ii) 
m a r s h a l l i n g a s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p l e t e record to enable this 
Court to say with c o n f i d e n c e that some or all of the 
f i n d i n g s are "clearly erroneous" within the meaning of Rule 
5 2 ( a ) , Utah R. Civ. P. or (iii) a s s e m b l i n g and m a r s h a l l i n g 
the e v i d e n c e " s u p p o r t i n g his v e r s i o n of the f a c t s " as 
r e q u i r e d by this court in Scharf v. B.M.G. Corporation, 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) . 
As s u c h , the court should d e c l i n e to review 
Sampson's contentions and affirm the judgment. 
ARGUMENT II 
UNDER THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLICABLE 
TO THIS APPEAL, THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CANNOT BE 
ASSAILED AND THE JUDGMENT CANNOT BE REVERSED 
Fewer p r i n c i p l e s could be better settled than the 
proposition that on a p p e l l a t e review the f i n d i n g s of fact 
and judgment of the trial court are presumed to be valid and 
correct and the heavy burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g e r r o r rests 
with the appellant. Hal Taylor Associates v. Union America, 
I n c . , 657 P.2d 7 4 3 , 747 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) ; Hutcheson v. Gleave, 
632 P.2d 8 1 5 , (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) . A n d , upon review, "this court 
views the evidence and all the i n f e r e n c e s that can r e a s o n -
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ably be drawn t h e r e f r o m in a light most supportive of the 
trial court's findings." Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 106 
(Utah 1984) • 
Unless clearly erroneous, findings of fact will not 
be set a s i d e , and, if there is a r e a s o n a b l e basis in 
e v i d e n c e , a trial court's award of damages will be affirmed 
on a p p e a l . Utah R. C i v . P. 5 2 ( a ) ; Katzenberger v. State, 
735 P.2d 405 (Utah A p p . 1 9 8 7 ) . F i n d i n g s will not be 
disturbed unless they are clearly against the w e i g h t of the 
e v i d e n c e or unless it m a n i f e s t l y a p p e a r s that the court 
m i s a p p l i e d the law to established facts. Brown v. Board of 
E d u c a t i o n of M o r g a n County School District, 560 P.2d 1129, 
(Utah 1 9 7 7 ) . 
The heavy burden imposed upon an appellant has been 
cogently expressed by this court as follows: 
It is i n c u m b e n t upon the a p p e l l a n t to 
marshall all of the evidence in support of 
the trial c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and to then 
demonstrate even when viewed in the light 
most f a v o r a b l e to the factual determina-
tions made by the trial c o u r t , that the 
e v i d e n c e is i n s u f f i c i e n t to support its 
findings. 
Harline v. Campbell , 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) . 
In this c a s e , and even c h a r i t a b l y i g n o r i n g the 
p r o b l e m s created by the i n c o m p l e t e record, S a m p s o n has 
failed to m a r s h a l l more than a f r a c t i o n of the e v i d e n c e 
u n d e r l y i n g the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s , r e g a r d l e s s of 
w h e t h e r those f i n d i n g s are deemed to be " p r o b a t i v e " or 
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 u l t i m a t e . " In his b r i e f , he n o w h e r e recites that his 
frequent statements that the Richins Parties' loan a d v a n c e s 
w e r e not required to be repaid rendered impossible an early 
settlement of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s 1 a f f a i r s and choked 
off t h e i r cash flow (R. 2 1 0 0 - 0 1 , 2 1 1 0 - 1 2 , 2 1 4 8 ) ; that his 
statements that the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s had b r e a c h e d v a r i o u s 
f i d u c i a r y d u t i e s had the same effect (R. 2 0 7 6 - 7 7 ) ; that he 
lent s u b s t a n t i a l a s s i s t a n c e to the IRS as an a d d i t i o n a l 
m e a n s for a c q u i r i n g control of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s 
(Exhibits 298 and 3 0 0 ) ; that he threatened to seek sanctions 
and "other r e l i e f " against the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s ' legal 
counsel if counsel continued to c h a l l e n g e the p r o p r i e t y of 
Sampson's conduct (R. 2 1 3 1 - 3 2 ) ; that he wrongfully solicited 
and received investor monies and crop proceeds in e x c e s s of 
$ 1 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 (R. 2150, 2 2 6 5 ) ; and, that he actively sought 
to conceal his acquisition of the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t and the 
m e t h o d s t h r o u g h w h i c h he seized control of the L i m i t e d 
Partnerships (R. 2051; Exhibit 8 8 ) , to name a few. 
Sampson's failure to assemble, marshal! and explain 
those vital facts is fatal to his appeal. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
SAMPSON USED A VARIETY OF IMPROPER MEANS TO 
SEIZE CONTROL OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND 
EXTINGUISH THE INTERESTS OF THE RICHINS PARTIES 
The seminal case in this jurisdiction defining the 
required elements of the tort of i n t e n t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e 
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with e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s is, of course, Leigh Furniture and 
C a r p e t C o . v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) • In adopting 
the O r e g o n d e f i n i t i o n of this tort, the court held that in 
order to recover damages, the plaintiff must: 
...prove (1) that the defendant intention-
ally i n t e r f e r e d with the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
e x i s t i n g or potential economic relations, 
(2) for an improper purpose or by improper 
m e a n s , (3) c a u s i n g injury to the plain-
tiff. 
IjA. at 304. 
In affirming the trial court's entry of judgment on 
a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in Leigh Furniture, 
t h i s court c a t a l o g e d the v a r i o u s acts of the d e f e n d a n t 
deemed to constitute improper means of i n t e r f e r e n c e . T h o s e 
i m p r o p e r means i n c l u d e d (i) f r e q u e n t visits to the plain-
tiff's store during business hours to confront, question and 
a c c u s e the o w n e r of d e f i c i e n c i e s in the o p e r a t i o n of the 
b u s i n e s s (ii) the p r e p a r a t i o n and s e n d i n g of n u m e r o u s 
l e t t e r s c o m p l a i n i n g of the manner in which the store owner 
was performing his contract of p u r c h a s e with the d e f e n d a n t 
( i i i ) the u n i l a t e r a l imposition of conditions not required 
by the purchase contract (iv) cajoling the owner to employ a 
b u s i n e s s consultant with whom the defendant was acquainted, 
but whom the owner was not inclined to hire (v) the f i l i n g 
of two a p p a r e n t l y g r o u n d l e s s lawsuits, and (vi) the filing 
of a c o m p l a i n t , w i t h o u t prior n o t i c e , to t e r m i n a t e the 
p u r c h a s e c o n t r a c t and repossess the owner's business. J_d. 
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at 2 9 7 - 3 0 1 , 3 0 6 . In f o c u s i n g on the cumulative effect of 
those improper means, the court compellingly observed that: 
Taken in isolation, each of the foregoing 
interferences with horn's b u s i n e s s might 
be j u s t i f i e d as an overly zealous attempt 
to p r o t e c t the c o r p o r a t i o n ' s interest 
under its contract of sale* As such, none 
would establish the intentional i n t e r f e r -
ence e l e m e n t of this t o r t , t h o u g h some 
might give rise to a cause of action for 
breach of s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s in the 
c o n t r a c t or the duty of good faith 
p e r f o r m a n c e which i n h e r e s in every 
c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n . Even in small 
g r o u p s , t h e s e acts might be explained as 
m e r e l y i n s t a n c e s of a g g r e s s i v e or 
abrasive -- though not illegal or tortious 
t a c t i c s , e x c e s s e s that o c c u r in 
c o n t r a c t u a l and commercial relationships. 
But in total and in cumulative e f f e c t , as 
a course of action extending over a period 
of three and one-half years and c u l m i n a t -
ing in the failure of Isom's business, the 
Leigh C o r p o r a t i o n ' s acts c r o s s e d the 
t h r e s h o l d beyond what is i n c i d e n t a l and 
justifiable to what is tortious. 
I^ d. at 306. 
The parallels between the improper means identified 
in Leigh F u r n i t u r e and t h o s e i d e n t i f i e d by the d i s t r i c t 
court in this case are striking. The improper means in this 
case i n c l u d e d (i) S a m p s o n ' s b r e a c h of his a g r e e m e n t to 
r e p r e s e n t the i n t e r e s t s of the Rich ins Parties in pending 
litigation, thereby allowing numerous d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t s to 
be entered against the Richins Parties, supra pp.10-12; (ii) 
S a m p s o n ' s breach of his a g r e e m e n t to serve s o l e l y as an 
initial r e p o s i t o r y for the d e p o s i t of i n v e s t o r f u n d s and 
i n s u r e that all such funds w e r e duly t r a n s m i t t e d to the 
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R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s , t h e r e b y c o m p l e t e l y c h o k i n g off the 
e n t i r e cash flow of the L i m i t e d Partnerships supra pp.12, 
1 3 ; ( i i i ) S a m p s o n ' s first effort to purchase, with Limited 
P a r t n e r s h i p f u n d s , the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t for the a d m i t t e d 
p u r p o s e of suing on it to the p r o f o u n d d e t r i m e n t of his 
former clients and in violation of Utah Code A n n . § 7 8 - 5 1 - 2 7 
s u p r a p p . 1 5 , 16; (iv) S a m p s o n ' s second effort to purchase 
the Osborn Judgment from the same source and for the same 
p u r p o s e J[_cU; (v) S a m p s o n ' s c o n c e a l m e n t from the Rich ins 
P a r t i e s of his intent to a c q u i r e the Osborn Judgment Id.; 
( v i ) S a m p s o n ' s f a i l u r e to provide the Rich ins Parties with 
any a d v a n c e n o t i c e of his intent to e n f o r c e the O s b o r n 
J u d g m e n t by suing his former clients on it in the State of 
Utah Jjd.; (viii) Sampson's preparation and sending of dozens 
of l e t t e r s to the l i m i t e d partners of the Limited Partner-
ship's in w h i c h he r e p e a t e d l y c r i t i c i z e d , d e n i g r a t e d and 
sought to h u m i l i a t e the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s supra p p . 1 4 , 15; 
( i x ) S a m p s o n ' s numerous oral statements to limited partners 
of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s to the same effect j_d . ; (x) 
S a m p s o n ' s f r e q u e n t and p a t e n t l y erroneous statements that 
the m a r k u p , i.e. the f a v o r a b l e w r i t e u p in the t e r m s and 
c o n d i t i o n s on w h i c h the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s sold the farm 
p r o p e r t i e s to the L i m i t e d Partnerships vi s a^  vi s the terms 
and c o n d i t i o n s on which the Richtron Companies obtained the 
farm properties from the original owners, was a breach of an 
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u n s p e c i f i e d f i d u c i a r y duty supra p . 9 ; (xi) S a m p s o n ' s 
r e p e a t e d and patently erroneous statements that the massive 
loan advances made by the Richins Parties for the benefit of 
the L i m i t e d Partnerships would not have to be repaid by the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s supra p p . 1 3 , 14; (xii) S a m p s o n ' s 
f a i l u r e and refusal to d e l i v e r to the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s 
c e r t a i n f o r e c l o s u r e d o c u m e n t s that he was duty bound to 
return (R. 2 1 5 0 - 5 1 ) ; (xiii) Sampson's legally improper use 
of limited voting p o w e r s of a t t o r n e y to s u b s t i t u t e his 
v a r i o u s c o r p o r a t i o n s as s u c c e s s o r general p a r t n e r of the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s supra p p . 1 7 - 1 9 ; (xiv) S a m p s o n ' s 
i l l - f a t e d effort to d e s i g n a t e a p r o f e s s i o n a l corporation 
organized for the purpose of practicing law as the m a n a g e r 
of a g r i c u l t u r a l properties in violation of the Utah Profes-
sional C o r p o r a t i o n s Act Jhd .; (xv) S a m p s o n ' s c o n s i s t e n t 
i n a b i l i t y or unwillingness to amend the certificates of the 
Limited Partnerships to reflect his s u p p o s e d a d m i t t a n c e as 
s u c c e s s o r general p a r t n e r as r e q u i r e d by the Utah Uniform 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p Act U^. ; (xvi) Sampson's unauthorized 
d i s c l o s u r e to third p a r t i e s of c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n 
o b t a i n e d during the c o u r s e of his r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 
R i c h i n s P a r t i e s (R. 2 1 6 0 ) ; ( x v i i ) S a m p s o n ' s p r e d a t o r y 
r e l i a n c e on the IRS's attempt to sell the a s s e t s of the 
R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s at public a u c t i o n ; ( x v i i i ) S a m p s o n ' s 
" b i z a r r e " and " u n p r o f e s s i o n a l " t h r e a t s to the R i c h i n s 
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P a r t i e s 1 legal c o u n s e l that u n l e s s counsel i m m e d i a t e l y 
r e f r a i n e d from f u r t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the R i c h i n s 
P a r t i e s , S a m p s o n w o u l d seek "sanctions" and "other relief" 
a g a i n s t counsel supra p . 4 ; ( x i x ) S a m p s o n ' s f i l i n g of a 
patently meritless lawsuit seeking to have himself appointed 
as receiver for the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s , which a c t i o n was 
d i s m i s s e d by reason of Sampson's failure to substitute his 
corporations as s u c c e s s o r general p a r t n e r of the L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p s in the m a n n e r r e q u i r e d by the Utah U n i f o r m 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p Act (R. 2 1 2 4 - 2 5 ) ; (xx) S a m p s o n ' s 
p i r a t i n g away of the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s ' e m p l o y e e s (R. 
2 1 4 1 ) ; (xxi) S a m p s o n ' s g l o a t i n g s t a t e m e n t to the l i m i t e d 
p a r t n e r s of the L i m i t e d Partnerships that he had purposely 
stonewalled the Rich ins Parties in t h e i r e f f o r t s to o b t a i n 
an a c c o u n t i n g of the m a n n e r in w h i c h he had received and 
d i s b u r s e d L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p funds supra p . 21; and (x x i i) 
S a m p s o n ' s c o n t i n u e d receipt and d i s b u r s e m e n t of L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p funds even after the federal d i s t r i c t court 
v o i d e d the tax sale from which Sampson traced his claim of 
title to the Richtron Companies' assets Id. 
In the f a c e of those findings, Sampson's assertion 
that the m e a n s he used to take control of the L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p s were not "predatory" and involved only "errors 
in judgment or technical legal v i o l a t i o n s " ( B r i e f , p . 3 6 ) , 
is i n t e r e s t i n g indeed. It is simply impossible to conceive 
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of a pattern of conduct, extending as it does over a period 
of more than four years, that constitutes a more d i s t u r b i n g 
blend of f r a u d u l e n t , d e c e p t i v e and o t h e r w i s e illegal 
conduct .10 
T h e r e f o r e , the district c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n that 
Sampson's seizure and control of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s 
was e f f e c t u a t e d t h r o u g h a series of improper means is 
abundantly supported by the meticulous and extensive factual 
f i n d i n g s . As s u c h , there is no basis for i n v a l i d a t i n g 
either the judgment or the findings on which the judgment is 
based. 
id 
ih 
lh 
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ARGUMENT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
SAMPSON'S TAKEOVER OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 
WAS ACTUATED BY AN IMPROPER PURPOSE 
A. The I n c o m p l e t e R e c o r d In This Appeal Precludes Sampson 
From S u s t a i n i n g His B u r d e n Of D e m o n s t r a t i n g That The 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t s Factual F i n d i n g s On This Issue Were 
CI early Erroneous. 
Sampson argues in his brief that the district court 
erred in concluding that Sampson's t a k e o v e r of the L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p s was a c t u a t e d by an i m p r o p e r p u r p o s e because 
there are "...no factual f i n d i n g s nor e v i d e n c e to j u s t i f y 
this c o n c l u s i o n . " ( B r i e f , p . 3 4 ) . The d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
w h e t h e r t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t " e v i d e n c e " s u p p o r t i n g the 
district court's decision cannot be made on the basis of the 
partial record available to the court. See, Arguments I and 
II, supra. Absent the complete record, there is no possible 
way to d e t e r m i n e whether the factual findings on this issue 
are "clearly erroneous" within the meaning of Rule 52(a) and 
the cases interpreting it. 
B. The E x i s t i n g R e c o r d A b u n d a n t l y S u p p o r t s The District 
Court's Conclusion That Sampson's Seizure Of The Limited 
Partnerships Was Actuated By An Improper Purpose. 
In c o n s i d e r i n g and a n a l y z i n g the massive evidence 
establishing Sampson's use of improper means in intruding in 
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the a f f a i r s of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s , S e e , p p . 36-39, 
supra, the district court had before it substantial evidence 
justifying the eminently reasonable inference that: 
..•the e v i d e n c e does m a k e c l e a r that 
Sampson's main goal and effort soon became 
one of g e t t i n g rid of R i c h i n s from all 
partnerships and obtaining control thereof 
for himself and his clients whom he never 
fully s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d . I think 
the evidence shows, and so find, that his 
s e l f - d e c l a r e d b e n e v o l e n t m o t i v e soon 
changed to one of greed and a v e n d e t t a to 
oust Richins and take complete control. 
(R. 2 1 5 9 ) . 
Obviously, the issue of whether an improper purpose 
h a s , in any given c a s e , been e s t a b l i s h e d r e q u i r e s that 
i n f e r e n c e s be drawn from the underlying conduct. Like most 
c a s e s , the record in this case does not c o n t a i n a frank 
a d m i s s i o n by the tortfeasor that he had an improper purpose 
in mind while engaging in the conduct deemed to be a c t i o n -
a b l e . That purpose can only be deduced from the determined 
facts. That is precisely what the district court d i d . Its 
conclusion on this issue must be sustained. 
ARGUMENT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
SAMPSON'S CONDUCT PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
INJURY TO THE RICHINS PARTIES 
A. S a m p s o n ' s C o n d u c t Was A S u b s t a n t i a l Factor In Causing 
Injury To The Richins Parties. 
In his b r i e f , S a m p s o n a s s e r t s that even assuming 
his conduct was carried out through improper means or by an 
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i m p r o p e r p u r p o s e , he is nevertheless insulated from liabil-
ity because he was not the proximate cause of injury to the 
R i c h i n s P a r t i e s , S p e c i f i c a l l y , he s u g g e s t s that the 
d i s t r i c t court should have a p p l i e d a "but f o r " test of 
c a u s a t i o n . (Brief, p. 4 2 ) . That assertion, however, badly 
misconceives the legal standard of proximate cause a p p l i c a -
ble to this case. 
The d i s t r i c t court expressly concluded that it was 
a c o m b i n a t i o n of the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s ' supposed negligence 
(mismanagement) and Sampson's tortious conduct that "brought 
t h i s case to court for a decision as to whether any damages 
are r e c o v e r a b l e . . . " (R. 2 2 7 5 ) . T h u s , the d i s t r i c t court 
c o n c l u d e d that the c o n d u c t of the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s and 
Sampson were concurrent causes of the complained-of injuries 
-- that i s , that e i t h e r of the c a u s e s , o p e r a t i n g a l o n e , 
w o u l d have been s u f f i c i e n t to result in the R i c h t r o n 
C o m p a n i e s ' i n a b i l i t y to enjoy the benefits of the Limited 
P a r t n e r s h i p a g r e e m e n t s . As s u c h , S a m p s o n ' s c o n d u c t is 
d e e m e d to be the legal cause of that injury "...if it was a 
material element and a s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r in b r i n g i n g it 
a b o u t . " W. P. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §41 at 
240 (4th Ed. 1 9 7 1 ) . T h u s , "if a defendant's conduct was a 
substantial f a c t o r in c a u s i n g the p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r y , it 
f o l l o w s that he will not be absolved from liability merely 
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b e c a u s e other c a u s e s have contributed to the result, since 
such causes, innumerable, are always present." Id. 
Clearly, the nature and extent of Sampson's efforts 
to displace the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s and insert h i m s e l f as 
t h e i r s u c c e s s o r easily rise to the level of being a "mater-
ial element and a substantial factor" within the m e a n i n g of 
a p p l i c a b l e case law* H o w e v e r b a d l y managed Sampson would 
like to b e l i e v e the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s w e r e , he cannot 
v a l i d l y c o n t e n d that his conduct was anything other than a 
substantial factor in bringing about injury to the R i c h t r o n 
C o m p a n i e s . S t a n d i n g a l o n e , each of the improper means of 
tortious interference found by the district court constitute 
a m a t e r i a l e l e m e n t and s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r in the injury 
inflicted on the Richtron Companies. When a g g r e g a t e d , they 
c o n s t i t u t e an o v e r w h e l m i n g body of e v i d e n c e that t h o s e 
injuries were not proximately caused by anything o t h e r than 
Sampson's conduct. 
B. Even A p p l i c a t i o n Of T h e " But F o r " Test S u p p o r t s The 
C o n c l u s i o n That S a m p s o n ' s T o r t i o u s C o n d u c t Was The 
Proximate Cause of Injury To The Richtron Companies. 
In the event it is d e t e r m i n e d that the d i s t r i c t 
court applied a "but f o r " test of p r o x i m a t e c a u s e , it is 
c l e a r that its f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s a d e q u a t e l y s u p p o r t the 
conclusion that Sampson's conduct was the proximate cause of 
the Richtron Companies 1 injuries. 
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At the o u t s e t , it is i m p o r t a n t to recognize that 
the factual f i n d i n g s set forth by S a m p s o n in his brief 
represent only one side of the proximate cause equation, and 
an i n c o m p l e t e one at t h a t . The only two relevant factual 
f i n d i n g s relied upon by S a m p s o n to support his conclusion 
that he is not the factual and p r o x i m a t e cause of the 
R i c h i n s P a r t i e s ' i n j u r i e s is (i) the fact that the Limited 
Partnerships 1 agreements were t e r m i n a b l e at w i l l , and (ii) 
the "fact" that the Limited Partnerships were suffering from 
11
 financial i n s t a b i l i t y . " ( B r i e f , p. 4 0 ) . H o w e v e r , what 
S a m p s o n fails to r e c o g n i z e is that the termi nabi 1 ity of a 
contract is a factor that has relevance only with respect to 
the issue of damages. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
§766(g) makes clear: 
A s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n [to v o i d a b l e con-
t r a c t s ] e x i s t s with a c o n t r a c t t h a t , by 
its terms or otherwise, permits the third 
person to terminate the agreement at will. 
Until he has so t e r m i n a t e d it, the 
contract is valid and subsisting, and the 
d e f e n d a n t may not properly interfere with 
it. The fact that the c o n t r a c t is 
t e r m i n a b l e at w i l l , h o w e v e r , is to be 
taken into account in d e t e r m i n i n g the 
d a m a g e s the p l a i n t i f f has suffered by 
reason of its breach. 
T h u s , the mere fact that the contract is terminable at will 
has no r e l e v a n c e to the issue of w h e t h e r , and to what 
e x t e n t , the p r o m i s e e ' s right to p e r f o r m a n c e has been 
impaired by the third party's tortious interference. 
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N e x t , even c h a r i t a b l y a s s u m i n g for p u r p o s e s of 
argument that the Limited Partnerships were in fact s u f f e r -
ing from " f i n a n c i a l instability" on the date Sampson first 
appeared on the scene, it is essential that that " f a c t " be 
placed in proper context. For example, the Limited Partner-
ships had been solvent, viable entities for over seven years 
by the time S a m p s o n first began t a m p e r i n g with t h e i r 
affairs. (R. 2068, 2128-29, 2 2 2 8 ) . In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e is 
no e v i d e n c e that any of the c o n t r a c t s under w h i c h the 
Richtron Companies were purchasing the farm p r o p e r t i e s were 
ever foreclosed upon. Indeed, the inference is irresistible 
that any default in the performance of those obligations was 
t i m e l y cured b e c a u s e the court p r o p e r l y found that while 
they were under the supervision of the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s , 
none of the farm properties were ever foreclosed upon. Id. 
All of the p r o p e r t i e s w e r e , h o w e v e r , f o r e c l o s e d upon or 
otherwise lost under Sampson's reign. Id. 
Moreover, under the Limited Partnership agreements, 
the limited p a r t n e r s were c o n t r a c t u a l l y o b l i g a t e d to pay 
t h e i r pro rata p o r t i o n of al 1 e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d by the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s . (Exhibit 1 1 5 ) . T h e r e f o r e , the 
continued ability of the Limited Partnerships to operate and 
u l t i m a t e l y p e r s e v e r e d e p e n d e d in the final a n a l y s i s upon 
the w i l l i n g n e s s of the limited p a r t n e r s to pay t h e i r pro 
rata p o r t i o n of t h o s e e x p e n s e s . Obviously, an event like 
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S a m p s o n f s u n l a w f u l s o l i c i t a t i o n and s e i z u r e of l i m i t e d 
partner funds had the effect of c h o k i n g off all cash flow 
a v a i l a b l e to the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s . When coupled with 
his repeated statements that the Richtron Companies were not 
e n t i t l e d to be repaid t h e i r a d v a n c e s and that the limited 
partners were not obligated to honor their agreement to pay 
the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s any " m a r k - u p , " it is a reasonable 
conclusion, as the d i s t r i c t court so d e t e r m i n e d , that any 
" f i n a n c i a l i n s t a b i l i t y " was created, exploited and exacer-
bated by S a m p s o n . The l o n g - s t a n d i n g v i a b i l i t y of the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s and t h e i r a b i l i t y to o b t a i n all 
required operating capital from the i n v e s t o r s (and t h e r e b y 
fund any o p e r a t i n g d e f i c i t s ) m i l i t a t e s s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t 
Sampson's assertion that he is not l e g a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e for 
injuries to the Richtron Companies. 
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, h o w e v e r 
" f i n a n c i a l l y i n s t a b l e , " the L i m i t e d Partnerships may have 
been as of May, 1980, S a m p s o n and his two l i m i t e d p a r t n e r 
c l i e n t s agreed that the value of the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s ' 
capital stock at that time was at least $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 . (R. 2 0 4 9 , 
2 0 7 7 - 7 8 , 2 1 4 4 , 2 2 7 0 ) . B e c a u s e the p r i m a r y v a l u e of that 
stock was based upon the Rictron Companies' interest in the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s , it is a reasonable inference that the 
going concern value of the Limited Partnerships was substan-
t i a l . As the district court noted: 
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As f l o u n d e r i n g as the partnerships were, 
Sampson saw value there and spent what now 
t o t a l s six years in achieving what he now 
has, whatever it may b e , l e a v i n g R i c h i n s 
and his companies with no tangible assets 
or values* 
(R. 2275) 
F i n a l l y , it is crucial to understand that each of 
the findings and conclusions set forth by Sampson on page 41 
of his brief relate only to Sampson fs liability for injuries 
and d a m a g e s inflicted on Richtron Financial -- an entity to 
w h o m the district court granted only nominal damages in the 
a m o u n t of $ 1 0 0 . 0 0 . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s a r t i c u l a t e d 
c o n c e r n s r e g a r d i n g the limited n a t u r e of legal injury to 
Richtron Financial is w h o l l y i r r e l e v a n t to e v a l u a t i n g the 
e x t e n s i v e e x t e n t to which the o t h e r R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s , 
R i c h t r o n , I n c . and R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l , were i n j u r e d and 
damaged. 
A c c o r d i n g l y , the record e s t a b l i s h e s that but for 
Sampson's seizure of the Limited Partnerships, the R i c h t r o n 
C o m p a n i e s would have obtained the various economic benefits 
e m b o d i e d by the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p a g r e e m e n t s . The 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n to that effect should be 
affi rmed. 
ARGUMENT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS REGARDING 
WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL ARE UNASSAILABLE 
In a s s e r t i n g that the d i s t r i c t court i m p r o p e r l y 
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c o n c l u d e d that the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s did not w a i v e or are 
estopped from complaining about S a m p s o n ' s c o n d u c t , S a m p s o n 
has failed to marshall all evidence relevant to that finding 
and to establish that even in the face of such evidence, the 
d i s t r i c t court erred in reaching the c o n c l u s i o n s that it 
did. Therefore, appellate review of that contention cannot 
be undertaken. 
ARGUMENT VII 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED TO THE 
RICHINS PARTIES DAMAGES OF MORE THAN $285,000.00 
Sampson a s s e r t s in this appeal that the district 
court erred in awarding $250,000.00 in consequential damages 
to R i c h t r o n , I n c . and R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l , $ 3 1 , 0 7 4 . 5 0 in 
special d a m a g e s in favor of R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l , and 
$ 4 , 2 2 2 . 5 0 in special damages in favor of Richtron, Inc. As 
d e m o n s t r a t e d b e l o w , (i) S a m p s o n ' s i n c l u s i o n of only a 
f r a c t i o n of the trial t r a n s c r i p t precludes him from chal-
lenging the damage awards and, (ii) to the extent the court 
e l e c t s to c o n s i d e r his claimed a s s i g n m e n t of e r r o r , the 
district court's findings of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and 
judgment on that issue are unassailable. 
A. The A b s e n c e Of The C o m p l e t e Trial Record Is Fatal To 
S a m p s o n ' s C h a l l e n g e To The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s Award Of 
Damages. 
In asking the court to reverse the district court's 
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d a m a g e a w a r d , S a m p s o n asserts generally that the award was 
" . . . w i t h o u t any e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s . " (Brief, p . 5 2 ) . H 
H o w e v e r , the " e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s " on which his appeal of 
d a m a g e s is based is hopelessly incomplete. Numerous courts 
have held that an a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e to p r o d u c e the 
t r a n s c r i p t of all e v i d e n c e bearing on the issue of damages 
p r e c l u d e s it from o b t a i n i n g a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w . Herron v. 
R o z e l l e , 480 F .2d 282, 288 (10th Cir. 1973) ("Appellant has 
failed to bring up a transcript of all evidence bearing on 
the issue of d a m a g e s to him. We d e c l i n e review since we 
cannot make a m e a n i n g f u l e v a l u a t i o n of the claim of 
e r r o r . " ) ; Grimard v. Carlston, 567 F.2d 1171, 1173 (1st Cir. 
1 9 7 8 ) (Where the court lacked a record of the lower court's 
denial of a motion for preliminary injunction, the s u f f i c i -
ency of those p r o c e e d i n g s would not be reviewed b e c a u s e 
there was no way of saying in the a b s e n c e of that record 
whether the court abused its discretion.) 
For that reason alone, the court should d e c l i n e to 
review Sampson's challenge to the district court's award of 
damages and affirm its judgment. 
H He further asserts in his brief that "as to the issue of 
d a m a g e s . . . t h e r e is n e i t h e r e v i d e n t i a r y s u p p o r t nor 
s u f f i c i e n t f i n d i n g s to support the award." (Brief, p. 
5 ) . For the reasons set forth in A r g u m e n t I a b o v e , 
f u r t h e r a p p e l l a t e review of the d a m a g e s issue is 
impossibly speculative. 
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B. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s Award Of Consequential Damages To 
R i c h t r o n Inc. And R i c h t r o n General In The Amount Of 
$ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 Is C o n s i s t e n t With A p p l i c a b l e Law And 
Abundantly Supported By The Existing Record On Appeal. 
Sampson argues that the $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 award of 
consequential damages to Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General 
should be reversed for several reasons. The first reason he 
advances is that the district court refrained from i d e n t i -
fying the p r e c i s e c o m p o s i t i o n of the $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 figure. 
S a m p s o n argues that the d i s t r i c t court was required to 
provide that information because the district court's use of 
the term " c o n s e q u e n t i a l " is, he b e l i e v e s , t a n t a m o u n t to 
" s p e c i a l " d a m a g e s . (Brief, p p . 5 2 , 5 3 ) . H o w e v e r , in 
a d v a n c i n g that a r g u m e n t , Sampson fails to adhere to the 
s p e c i f i c d i s t i n c t i o n s e n u n c i a t e d by the d r a f t e r s of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §774A that: 
(1) One who is liable to a n o t h e r for 
interference with a c o n t r a c t or p r o s p e c -
tive c o n t r a c t u a l relation is liable for 
d a m a g e s for (a) the pecuniary loss of the 
b e n e f i t s of a contract or the prospective 
r e l a t i o n ; (b) c o n s e q u e n t i a l losses for 
which the interference is the legal cause; 
and (c) emotional distress or actual harm 
to r e p u t a t i o n , if they are r e a s o n a b l y 
expected to result from the interference. 
(Emphasis a d d e d ) . 
C l e a r l y , s u b p a r a g r a p h (a) of §774A is referring to special 
damages when it uses the term "pecuniary loss." By the same 
t o k e n , s u b p a r a g r a p h ( b ) , in using the term "consequential 
losses," appears to denote general damages that are deemed 
to flow n a t u r a l l y and necessarily, albeit indirectly, from 
-52-
the harm d o n e . I n d e e d , the d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of 
"consequential damages" is that they are damages that do not 
flow directly and immediately from the act of the party, but 
only from some of the consequences or a result of such act. 
Bl ack's Law Dictionary, p. 457 (4th edition 1 9 6 8 ) . That is 
the sense in w h i c h the d i s t r i c t court intended to use the 
term. (R. 2 2 6 1 ) . 
N u m e r o u s o t h e r courts have used the term "conse-
q u e n t i a l " in the same w a y . S t a t e of M a r y l a n d for use of 
Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate and Trust Co., 83 F. Supp. 91, 
102 (D. Md. 1938) (Consequential damages are those which the 
cause in question naturally but indirectly p r o d u c e s . ) ; Deetz 
v. C o b b s and M i t c h e l l C o . , 120 O r . 6 0 0 , 253 P. 5 4 2 , 544 
( 1 9 3 5 ) ( C o n s e q u e n t i a l damages are those that follow natur-
ally, but indirectly, from a wrongful a c t . ) . 
It would appear that the district court's choice of 
the term "consequential" in defining the damages recoverable 
by the R i c h i n s Parties was intended only to denote that the 
damages, w h i l e f l o w i n g n a t u r a l l y from S a m p s o n ' s t o r t i o u s 
c o n d u c t , only i n d i r e c t l y caused the l o s s . The c o n t e x t 
w i t h i n which that term is used is i n c o m p a t i b l e with the 
n o t i o n that the d i s t r i c t court i n t e n d e d to award the 
functional equivalent of special damages for which s p e c i f i c 
proof of precise loss would be required. 
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N e x t , S a m p s o n fails to recognize that the district 
court is not required to calibrate with a b s o l u t e p r e c i s i o n 
the amount of d a m a g e s to be a w a r d e d . As this court has 
consistently held: 
Although an award of damages based only on 
s p e c u l a t i o n cannot be u p h e l d , it is 
g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d that some degree of 
u n c e r t a i n t y in the e v i d e n c e of d a m a g e s 
will not s u f f i c e to r e l i e v e a defendant 
from recompensing a wronged plaintiff. As 
long as there is some rational basis for a 
damage award, it is the wrongdoer who must 
assume the risk of uncertainty. (Emphasis 
a d d e d ) . 
Bast i an v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) ; Winsness v. 
M . J . C o n o c o Distributors, 593 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1 9 7 9 ) . And, 
" w h e r e there is evidence of the fact of damage, a defendant 
may not e s c a p e l i a b i l i t y b e c a u s e the amount of d a m a g e s 
cannot be proved with p r e c i s i o n . " 661 P.2d at 956. That 
principle has also been expressed as follows: 
Once a d e f e n d a n t has been shown to have 
caused a loss, he should not be allowed to 
escape liability because the amount of the 
loss cannot be proved with p r e c i s i o n , 
[ c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ] C o n s e q u e n t l y , the 
reasonable level of certainty required to 
e s t a b l i s h the amount of a loss is gener-
ally lower than that required to establish 
the fact or cause of a loss. 
Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . 
When evaluated in the light of those principles, it 
is clear that the district court's award of c o n s e q u e n t i a l 
d a m a g e s in the amount of $250,000.00 has a "rational basis" 
in the existing record. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the d i s t r i c t court 
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e x p r e s s l y found and concluded that the date on which the 
federal district court voided the IRS tax sale on which 
Sampson based his claim of interest in the Limited Partner-
ships -- May 16, 1984 -- "ended then and t h e r e " S a m p s o n ' s 
right to take "...any further steps in the winding up of any 
affairs of the partnerships in which the Richtron C o m p a n i e s 
remained as general p a r t n e r . " (R. 2 2 3 1 ) . The court then 
o b s e r v e d that d e s p i t e the entry of that o r d e r , Sampson 
" u n d a u n t i n g l y " 12 continued from that point to collect and 
receive additional limited p a r t n e r monies w h i c h , as of 
October 29, 1984 (the last day for which the Richins Parties 
were able to obtain Sampson's accounting r e c o r d s ) t o t a l l e d 
$ 2 8 8 , 5 9 7 . 0 0 -- $ 2 4 5 , 5 9 7 . 0 0 of which were contained in the 
C o n s o l i d a t e d Farms account and $ 4 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 of which were 
c o n t a i n e d in the Ag M a n a g e m e n t a c c o u n t . (R. 2229, 2263, 
2 2 7 6 ) . Immediately after rendering its conclusions regard-
ing S a m p s o n ' s unlawful c o l l e c t i o n and retention of those 
monies after the federal court o r d e r , the court c o n c l u d e d 
that the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s had e s t a b l i s h e d d a m a g e s "of at 
least a consequential nature" that had been established with 
"...a r e a s o n a b l e d e g r e e of certainty by a preponderance of 
the evidence/' (R. 2 2 7 6 ) . 
T h e r e f o r e , in fixing the Richins Parties' damages 
at $250,000.00, the court had before it an eminently certain 
1 2
 R. 2276. 
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basis for fixing t h o s e damages -- the aggregate amount of 
all monies collected and retained by Sampson after entry and 
in v i o l a t i o n of the federal court o r d e r . T h u s , the 
$250,000.00 damage award suffers from none of the lack of 
p r e c i s i o n of which Sampson complains. It has an abundantly 
"rational basis" in the record and cannot be overturned. 
C. The Lower Court P r o p e r l y Awarded To Richtron, Inc. And 
R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l D a m a g e s A r i s i n g From S a m p s o n ' s 
T e r m i n a t i o n Of T h e i r Limited P a r t n e r s h i p Interest In 
Several Of The Limited Partnerships. 
The d i s t r i c t court properly awarded $30,974.50 to 
R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l to c o m p e n s a t e it for the loss of its 
limited p a r t n e r interest in three of the Limited Partner-
ships and $4,222.50 to Richtron, I n c . to c o m p e n s a t e it for 
its loss in one of the Limited Partnerships. (R. 2087-88, 
2239, 2272, 2 2 7 7 ) . The sole basis on which Sampson seeks to 
r e v e r s e that award is that t h e r e is s u p p o s e d l y "...no 
showing by [the Rich ins P a r t i e s ] that at the time Sampson 
took over the o p e r a t i o n of the p a r t n e r s h i p s that their 
original capital c o n t r i b u t i o n s were at the same value as 
when they were i n i t i a l l y c o n t r i b u t e d . " ( B r i e f , p. 5 5 ) . 
That assertion is contradicted by the record. The d i s t r i c t 
court specifically determined that Sampson filed various tax 
returns for the Limited Partnerships for the tax year ending 
D e c e m b e r 3 1 , 1 9 8 0 . (R. 2 0 8 7 - 8 8 ) . T hose returns clearly 
r e f l e c t e d R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l ' s capital interest in the 
C a t l o w Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s in the amount of $ 1 0 , 2 1 2 . 0 0 . 
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I d. Therefore, Sampson's own documents establish the then 
existing value of Richtron Financial's capital interest in 
those partnerships. 
In addition, Sampson asks the court in his brief to 
consider that the Catlow Limited Partnerships were in 
foreclosure in May, 1980 and that an additional $240,000.00 
had to be raised to save the property. (Brief, p. 5 5 ) . He 
thereby implies that the value of those, and perhaps other, 
partnerships was worthless. However, in a letter dated June 
26, 1981 (Exhibit ) , Sampson informed the limited 
partners that: "as far as the properties are concerned, all 
except perhaps Kanosh, are in as good or better shape than 
ever before." Therefore, Sampson's own admissions to the 
limited partners validate and give credence to the values 
determined by the district court. Those valuations should 
not be modified. 
ARGUMENT VIII 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO 
IMPOSE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST SAMPSON. 
Utah law is well-settled that the imposition of 
punitive damages seeks to serve multiple salutary purposes. 
Those purposes include (i) punishing a wrongdoer for conduct 
so wrongful that "...it seems to one's sense of justice that 
mere recompense for actual loss is inadequate..." Kessler 
v. Rogers , 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1 9 7 5 ) ; (ii) ensuring 
that the wrongdoer should suffer an additional penalty for 
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that character of wrongful conduct Jji.; and (iii) ensuring 
that such an award serve as a " . . . w h o l e s o m e warning to 
others not to engage in similar misdoings." l^. See also, 
Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, (Utah 1975); Palombi v. D 
& C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969). 
In Utah, punitive damages can be awarded where the 
wrongdoer fs conduct " . . . m a n i f e s t s a knowing and reckless 
i n d i f f e r e n c e " to o t h e r s * ^
 0 r if there is "...such gross 
neglect of duty as to evince a reckless indifference of the 
rights of others on the part of the wrongdoer, and an entire 
want of care so as to raise the presumption that the person 
at fault is c o n s c i o u s of the consequences of his careless-
n e s s . " Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 
1131 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) . T h e r e f o r e , like many states, Utah has 
retreated from a requirement that punitive damages can be 
awarded only if the misconduct is deemed to be "willful and 
m a l i c i o u s . " W. P r o s s e r , The Law of Torts §2 at 9-14 (4th 
Ed. 1 9 7 1 ) . 
In deciding whether to award punitive damages, the 
fact finder is required to weigh such considerations as the 
nature of the d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t s , the effect of the defen-
dant's misconduct on the lives of the plaintiff and o t h e r s , 
the probability of future recurrence of such misconduct, the 
1 3
 Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 
1 9 8 3 ) . 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the parties, the wealth of the defen-
dant, the facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct 
and the amount of actual damages awarded. Bundy v. Century 
E q u i p m e n t C o . , 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) ; Cruz v. Montoya, 
660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) ; First Security Bank of Utah, L A . 
v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) . 
In the case at hand, the district court declined to 
award p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s . (R. 2 1 8 2 - 8 8 ; 2 2 4 9 ) . It did so 
despite the fact that it identified and enumerated dozens of 
facts e s t a b l i s h i n g S a m p s o n ' s r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d for the 
rights of the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s . T h o s e facts and c i r c u m -
stances include: (i) Sampson's breach of his a g r e e m e n t to 
r e p r e s e n t the i n t e r e s t s of the R i c h i n s Parties in pending 
litigation, thereby allowing numerous default j u d g m e n t s to 
be entered against the Richins Parties, supra pp.10-12; (ii) 
S a m p s o n ' s breach of his a g r e e m e n t to serve solely as an 
initial r e p o s i t o r y for the d e p o s i t of i n v e s t o r funds and 
e n s u r e that all such funds were duly t r a n s m i t t e d to the 
R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s , t h e r e b y c o m p l e t e l y choking off the 
e n t i r e cash flow of the Limited Partnerships supra pp.12, 
1 3 ; (iii) S a m p s o n ' s first effort to purchase, with Limited 
P a r t n e r s h i p f u n d s , the Osborn J u d g m e n t for the a d m i t t e d 
p u r p o s e of suing on it to the p r o f o u n d d e t r i m e n t of his 
former clients and in violation of Utah Code A n n . § 7 8 - 5 1 - 2 7 
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supra p p . 1 5 , 16; (iv) S a m p s o n ' s second effort to purchase 
the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t from the same source and for the same 
p u r p o s e J[_d. ; (v) S a m p s o n ' s c o n c e a l m e n t from the Rich ins 
P a r t i e s of his intent to a c q u i r e the Osborn Judgment Id.; 
( v i ) S a m p s o n ' s f a i l u r e to provide the Rich ins Parties with 
any a d v a n c e n o t i c e of his intent to e n f o r c e the O s b o r n 
J u d g m e n t by suing his former clients on it in the State of 
Utah j_d.; (viii) Sampson's preparation and sending of dozens 
of l e t t e r s to the l i m i t e d partners of the Limited Partner-
ships in which he r e p e a t e d l y c r i t i c i z e d , d e n i g r a t e d and 
s o u g h t to h u m i l i a t e the Rich ins P a r t i e s supra p p . 1 4 , 15; 
( i x ) S a m p s o n ' s numerous oral statements to limited partners 
of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s to the same effect Jji.; (x) 
S a m p s o n ' s f r e q u e n t and p a t e n t l y erroneous statements that 
the m a r k u p , i.e. the f a v o r a b l e w r i t e u p in the t e r m s and 
c o n d i t i o n s on w h i c h the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s sold the farm 
p r o p e r t i e s to the L i m i t e d Partnerships vi s _a vi s the terms 
and c o n d i t i o n s on which the Richtron Companies obtained the 
farm properties from the original owners, was a breach of an 
u n s p e c i f i e d f i d u c i a r y duty s u p r a p . 9 ; (xi) S a m p s o n ' s 
r e p e a t e d and patently erroneous statements that the massive 
loan advances made by the Richins Parties for the benefit of 
the L i m i t e d Partnerships would not have to be repaid by the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s supra p p . 1 3 , 1 4 ; (xii) S a m p s o n ' s 
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f a i l u r e and refusal to d e l i v e r to the Rich ins P a r t i e s 
c e r t a i n f o r e c l o s u r e d o c u m e n t s that he was duty bound to 
return (R. 2 1 5 0 - 5 1 ) ; (xiii) Sampson's legally improper use 
of limited voting powers of a t t o r n e y to s u b s t i t u t e his 
v a r i o u s c o r p o r a t i o n s as s u c c e s s o r general p a r t n e r of the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s supra p p . 1 7 - 1 9 ; (xiv) S a m p s o n ' s 
i l l - f a t e d effort to d e s i g n a t e a p r o f e s s i o n a l corporation 
organized for the purpose of practicing law as the m a n a g e r 
of a g r i c u l t u r a l properties in violation of the Utah Profes-
sional C o r p o r a t i o n s Act ld_.; (xv) S a m p s o n ' s c o n s i s t e n t 
i n a b i l i t y or unwillingness to amend the certificates of the 
Limited Partnerships to reflect his supposed a d m i t t a n c e as 
s u c c e s s o r general p a r t n e r as r e q u i r e d by the Utah Uniform 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p Act Jjj.; (xvi) Sampson's unauthorized 
d i s c l o s u r e to third p a r t i e s of c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n 
o b t a i n e d during the c o u r s e of his r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 
Rich ins P a r t i e s (R. 2 1 6 0 ) ; ( x v i i ) S a m p s o n ' s p r e d a t o r y 
r e l i a n c e on the IRS's attempt to sell the assets of the 
R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s at public a u c t i o n ; ( x v i i i ) S a m p s o n ' s 
" b i z a r r e " and " u n p r o f e s s i o n a l " t h r e a t s to the Rich ins 
P a r t i e s ' legal counsel that u n l e s s counsel i m m e d i a t e l y 
r e f r a i n e d from f u r t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the R i c h i n s 
P a r t i e s , S a m p s o n would seek "sanctions" and "other relief" 
a g a i n s t counsel supra p . 4 ; (xix) S a m p s o n ' s f i l i n g of a 
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patently meritless lawsuit seeking to have himself appointed 
as receiver for the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s , which a c t i o n was 
d i s m i s s e d by reason of Sampson's failure to substitute his 
corporations as s u c c e s s o r general p a r t n e r of the L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p s in the m a n n e r r e q u i r e d by the Utah U n i f o r m 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p Act (R. 2 1 2 4 - 2 5 ) ; (xx) S a m p s o n ' s 
p i r a t i n g away of the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s ' e m p l o y e e s (R. 
2 1 4 1 ) ; (xxi) S a m p s o n ' s g l o a t i n g s t a t e m e n t to the limited 
p a r t n e r s of the L i m i t e d Partnerships that he had purposely 
stonewalled the Richins Parties in t h e i r e f f o r t s to o b t a i n 
an a c c o u n t i n g of the m a n n e r in w h i c h he had received and 
d i s b u r s e d L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p funds supra p . 2 1 ; (x x i i) 
S a m p s o n ' s c o n t i n u e d receipt and d i s b u r s e m e n t of L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p funds even after the federal d i s t r i c t court 
v o i d e d the tax sale from which Sampson traced his claim of 
t i t l e to the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s ' assets Ij^. ; ( x x i i i ) 
S a m p s o n ' s commission of the foregoing acts despite the fact 
that he was "...no novice in limited partnership c o n t r o v e r -
s i e s . " (R. 2 1 3 5 ) ; ( x x i v ) the fact that Sampson's " ...self-
declared benevolent motive soon changed to one of greed and 
a vendetta to oust Richins and take complete control [of the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s ] . " (R. 2 1 5 9 ) ; (xxv) S a m p s o n ' s 
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"...desire to do harm to defendants for its own sake..." (R. 
2 1 5 9 ) ; and ( x x v i ) S a m p s o n ' s " i n c r e d i b l e " i n a b i l i t y to 
c o n f o r m his c o n d u c t to the r e q u i r e m e n t s of applicable law 
(R. 2 2 2 4 ) . 
As noted a b o v e , the d i s t r i c t court expressly and 
correctly found that " . . . S a m p s o n was no novice in limited 
p a r t n e r s h i p c o n t r o v e r s i e s " * 4 by virtue of his prior 
involvement as counsel for the a p p e l l a n t general p a r t n e r s 
in the leading Utah case defining the respective rights and 
d u t i e s of general p a r t n e r s vi s a^  vi s limited p a r t n e r s , 
H a r l i n e v. Daines, 567 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) . Notably, the 
Court in that case explicitly informed Sampson that, "until 
the general partners were ousted, they alone under S e c t i o n 
4 8 - 2 - 9 , U.C.A. 1953, had the right and power to conduct the 
business of the [limited] partnership." 567 P.2d at 1 1 2 4 . 
Yet d e s p i t e that blunt m e s s a g e , S a m p s o n w a s , some three 
years later, waging war against the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s on the 
t h e o r y that he and his two limited p a r t n e r clients could 
operate the Limited Partnerships without properly r e p l a c i n g 
the Richtron Companies as general partner. 
In the face of a factual record r e p l e t e with 
i n s t a n c e upon i n s t a n c e of p r e d a t o r y and reckless conduct, 
the district court lamely concluded that the Richins Parties 
11
 ...did not prove by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of the e v i d e n c e an 
1 4
 R. 2135. 
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e n t i t l e m e n t to p u n i t i v e damages in this case and I so con-
c l u d e . " (R. 2 2 4 9 ) . In r e a c h i n g that c o n c l u s i o n , the 
d i s t r i c t court r e p e a t e d l y c o m m e n t e d that t h e r e was no 
s h o w i n g that S a m p s o n knew that what he was doing was a 
violation of law. For example, the court found that, "there 
was no direct proof that Sampson was aware of the provisions 
of § 7 8 - 5 1 - 2 7 , which rendered his acquisition of the Osborn 
Judgment, as a l a w y e r , a s e r i o u s v i o l a t i o n of law." (R. 
2 1 2 4 ) . A n d , "...it is my o p i n i o n that as wrong as Sampson 
was in many of the t h i n g s he d i d , I think he b e l i e v e d 
h i m s e l f to be right in doing what he did in the way he did 
them. He should have known the law, but I do not believe he 
intentionally violated it." (R. 2187) (Emphasis a d d e d ) . 
It a p p e a r s , t h e r e f o r e , that although the district 
court paid lip s e r v i c e to the Utah cases a u t h o r i z i n g the 
r e c o v e r y of p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s in the absence of willful or 
malicious conduct, it nevertheless applied a more s t r i n g e n t 
s t a n d a r d -- one of w i l l f u l and i n t e n t i o n a l conduct -- in 
electing not to award such damages a g a i n s t S a m p s o n . T h u s , 
the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t in that regard is both 
factually and legally erroneous. This court should remand 
that p o r t i o n of the district court's judgment with instruc-
tions to award punitive damages in such a m o u n t s as may be 
d i c t a t e d by the numerous factors of which it is required to 
take account. 
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ARGUMENT IX 
AS THE SOLE, AUTHORIZED GENERAL PARTNERS OF 
THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, RICHTRON, INC. AND 
RICHTRON GENERAL WERE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE 
ALL CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS PAID BY THE LIMITED 
PARTNERS AND ALL PROCEEDS DERIVED FROM THE 
SALE OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS' ASSETS. THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO AWARD THEM DAMAGES FOR 
THE FULL AMOUNT COLLECTED AND DISBURSED BY SAMPSON 
DURING THE FIRST 28 MONTHS OF HIS UNLAWFUL CONTROL 
OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS -- $645,101.38 --
IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Utah has long adopted the b l a c k - l e t t e r legal 
p r i n c i p l e that in a limited partnership the general partner 
has sole power and a u t h o r i t y to m a n a g e and control the 
p a r t n e r s h i p . That p r i n c i p l e has been expressed by the Utah 
S u p r e m e Court in H a r 1 i n e s u p r a , 567 P.2d at 1124 as 
fol1ows: 
Until the general p a r t n e r s were ousted, 
they alone under §48-2-9, U.C.A. 1953, had 
the right and power to c o n d u c t the 
business of the partnership... 
See al so, Utah C o d e A n n . § 4 8 - 1 - 2 1 (1953 as a m e n d e d ) . 
Notably, each of the limited partnership agreements at issue 
in this case vested in e i t h e r R i c h t r o n , Inc. or R i c h t r o n 
General e x c l u s i v e control o v e r , and m a n a g e m e n t of, the 
Limited Partnerships. (Exhibit 2 5 0 , pp. 3 and 6 ) . T h o s e 
p r o v i s i o n s 1 5 could not be clearer: 
The General Partner shall have full charge 
of the m a n a g e m e n t , conduct, and operation 
of the Partnership affairs in all respects 
and in all matters... 
1 5
 A r t i c l e s V ( l ) and VI (2) of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p 
agreements. 
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No L i m i t e d Partner shall take part in the 
conduct or control of the a f f a i r s of the 
Partnershi p . . . 
Consequently, the district court correctly conclud-
ed that: 
The p a r t n e r s h i p agreement placed the full 
c h a r g e of the m a n a g e m e n t , c o n d u c t and 
o p e r a t i o n of the p a r t n e r s h i p in all 
r e s p e c t s and in all m a t t e r s upon the 
general p a r t n e r and specifically provided 
that no limited partner shall take part in 
the c o n d u c t or control of the affairs of 
the partnership. (R. 2215) 
Thus, in the words of the H a r1i n e case, until Rich-
t r o n , I n c . and R i c h t r o n General w e r e l a w f u l l y removed or 
"ousted" as general p a r t n e r s of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s , 
they alone had the right and power to conduct the business 
of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s . As noted a b o v e , ^ Sampson's 
m u l t i p l e e f f o r t s to s u b s t i t u t e h i m s e l f and his v a r i o u s 
c o r p o r a t i o n s as s u c c e s s o r general p a r t n e r of the Limited 
Partnerships fell far short of complying even colorably with 
the r e q u i r e m e n t s of Utah law. I n d e e d , the district court 
properly found and c o n c l u d e d that S a m p s o n ' s s u b s t i t u t i o n 
e f f o r t s w e r e "...invalid ab initio as not being in conform-
ity with law and had no force or effect in r e m o v i n g the 
Richtron general p a r t n e r s . " (R. 2 2 2 6 ) . It also p r o p e r l y 
c o n c l u d e d that onl y the general partner (Richtron, Inc. or 
R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l ) had the a u t h o r i t y to make a s s e s s m e n t s 
!6 pp. 17-19, supra. 
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a g a i n s t the l i m i t e d partners (R. 2 2 1 0 ) ; that Sampson's use 
of L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p funds was " . . . u n a u t h o r i z e d as 
R i c h t r o n , Inc. r e m a i n e d general p a r t n e r with c o m p l e t e 
control over partnership affairs" (R. 2 2 3 6 ) ; and, that those 
funds were " . . f u n d s over which the general partner should 
have had c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l . " (R. 2 0 5 8 ) . F i n a l l y , the 
d i s t r i c t court p r o p e r l y d e t e r m i n e d that between June 27, 
1980 and November 30, 1982, Sampson collected and d i s b u r s e d 
in " w h a t e v e r way he d e t e r m i n e d " the sum of $645,101.38 in 
capital contributions and proceeds derived from the sale of 
Limited Partnership assets. (R. 2158, 2 1 3 0 ) . 
Incredibly, however, the district court declined to 
award any damages to Richtron, Inc. or Richtron General for 
any portion of the $645,101.38 of which they were d e p r i v e d , 
r e a s o n i n g that "...most of the funds that passed through 
Sampson's hands were paid out on partnership expenses." (R. 
2 2 6 6 ) . It held that to the extent any of the " . . . f u n d s 
[were] used to apply on legitimate partnership obligations," 
Sampson was entitled to a credit. (R. 2 2 6 7 ) . However, that 
c o n c l u s i o n begs the primary u l t i m a t e issue in the c a s e , 
n a m e l y , who as b e t w e e n the R i c h t r o n Companies and Sampson 
had authority to serve as general p a r t n e r of the L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p s ? Once that issue was resolved in favor of the 
R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s , only they could be deemed to be the 
a r b i t e r of what was or was not a " l e g i t i m a t e partnership 
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o b l i g a t i o n . " S a m p s o n could not. Once he was determined to 
be an interloper and a "mere officious intermeddler" in the 
a f f a i r s of the L i m i t e d Partnerships, his claimed authority 
for soliciting, receiving and disbursing Limited Partnership 
funds and selling Limited Partnership assets was extinguish-
ed. Once his authority was extinguished, he became liable 
to the a u t h o r i z e d , i n c u m b e n t general p a r t n e r s (Richtron, 
I n c . and R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l ) for all such m o n i e s . ^ The 
district court's refusal as a matter of law to so c o n c l u d e 
s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d and remanded to the district court with 
instructions to enter j u d g m e n t in f a v o r of R i c h t r o n , I n c . 
and R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l in the p r i n c i p a l sum of $645,101.38 
plus interest. 
ARGUMENT X 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO AWARD 
DAMAGES TO THE RICHTRON COMPANIES FOR ALL 
LOAN ADVANCES THEY MADE TO THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS. 
During 1979 and 1980, many of the limited p a r t n e r s 
" f r e q u e n t l y and repeatedly" refused to pay assessments made 
7 Of c o u r s e , S a m p s o n could at any time have resorted to 
Utah Code Ann. §48-1-35, which allows a general p a r t n e r 
to p o s s e s s p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y , provided, he pays to 
any partner "...who has caused the d i s s o l u t i o n w r o n g -
fully the v a l u e of his i n t e r e s t in the partnership at 
dissolution, less any damages r e c o v e r a b l e u n d e r c l a u s e 
(2)(a) 2nd of this section or secure the payment by bond 
approved by the court, and in like manner i n d e m n i f y him 
a g a i n s t all present or future partnership liabilities." 
H o w e v e r , S a m p s o n failed to do so and is t h e r e f o r e 
p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e for all d a m a g e s o c c a s i o n e d by his 
efforts to possess the Limited Partnerships 1 property. 
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by R i c h t r o n , I n c . and R i c h t r o n General for the purpose of 
funding the operating expenses of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . 
(R. 2 0 9 9 ) . Accordingly, Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General, 
acting p u r s u a n t to the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s ' a g r e e m e n t s , 
m a d e e x t e n s i v e loan advances for the benefit of the Limited 
Partnerships. The district court a r t i c u l a t e d that p r o c e s s 
as follows: 
The general partner could not make capital 
investments in any p a r t n e r s h i p , but did, 
under e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n s of the partner-
ship a g r e e m e n t s , have the d i s c r e t i o n to 
advance monies to the partnerships for use 
in the o p e r a t i o n s . The a g g r e g a t e amount 
of such advances to any partnership became 
an o b l i g a t i o n of the p a r t n e r s h i p to the 
general p a r t n e r m a k i n g those advances to 
be repaid in a c c o r d a n c e with the loan 
i n s t r u m e n t or the a g r e e m e n t . Any such 
advances to any partnership established by 
the e v i d e n c e was a debt repayable to the 
general p a r t n e r . ( A r t i c l e V ( l ) ( c ) and 
A r t i c l e V 11(13 ) [of the Limited Partner-
ship a g r e e m e n t s ] ) . S a m p s o n ' s s t a t e m e n t s 
to the c o n t r a r y to the l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s 
did not a l t e r such o b l i g a t i o n s . (R. 
2 2 1 0 - 1 1 ) . 
... 
T h r o u g h o u t all the d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e 
when a d v a n c e s w e r e being d i s c u s s e d , 
Rich i n s ' p o s i t i o n that they should be 
repaid r e m a i n e d a d a m a n t , while Sampson's 
p o s i t i o n that a d v a n c e s w e r e not valid 
debts to be repaid to d e f e n d a n t s by the 
partnerships seemed just as a d a m a n t , and 
he repeatedly told limited partners either 
o r a l l y or in l e t t e r s that such was his 
o p i n i o n and advice. However, other than a 
s u g g e s t i o n that such c l a i m s w e r e s e l f -
s e r v i n g , Sampson never told the court why 
advances so made did not b e c o m e p a r t n e r -
ship d e b t s u n d e r the p a r t n e r s h i p a g r e e -
m e n t s that w e r e r e p a y a b l e as p r o v i d e d 
t h e r e i n . I find that such advances were 
made under the partnership a g r e e m e n t s and 
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were r e p a y a b l e as p r o v i d e d t h e r e i n . (R. 
2 1 4 8 ) . 
The e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d that the net a g g r e g a t e 
principal amount of loan advances made by Richtron, Inc. and 
Richtron General to the Limited Partnerships was $585,036.00 
plus interest in the amount of $ 1 5 1 , 6 7 8 . 0 0 (Exhibit 1 5 8 ) . 
The d i s t r i c t court then c o n c l u d e d that "Sampson prevented 
the partnerships from p e r f o r m i n g t h e i r c o n t r a c t s with the 
d e f e n d a n t s by his t a k i n g over c o m p l e t e control of the 
partnerships..." (R. 2 2 5 4 ) . H owever, it then i n e x p l i c a b l y 
d e c l i n e d to r e q u i r e Sampson to pay damages in that amount 
arising from his t o r t i o u s i n t e r f e r e n c e with the R i c h t r o n 
C o m p a n i e s ' rights under the Limited Partnership agreements. 
The only c o n c l u s i o n that can be fairly drawn from the 
e v i d e n c e is that but for Sampson's repeated statements that 
the loan advances did not need to be repaid and his b l a t a n t 
i n t e r f e r e n c e with the o p e r a t i o n s of the L i m i t e d Partner-
s h i p s , the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s w o u l d have r e c e i v e d t h o s e 
payments from the Limited Partnerships. However, each of the 
wrongful means of contract interference identified at pages 
3 6 - 3 9 s u p r a , e f f e c t i v e l y d e s t r o y e d that c o n t r a c t u a l 
e x p e c t a n c y . A c c o r d i n g l y , this court should r e v e r s e the 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n to refrain from a w a r d i n g such 
d a m a g e s and remand with i n s t r u c t i o n s to enter judgment in 
f a v o r of the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s in the amount of 
$736,714.00. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in A r g u m e n t s I through 
VII a b o v e , the Court should affirm the d i s t r i c t court's 
j u d g m e n t and t h e r e b y enable the Rich ins P a r t i e s to be 
c o m p e n s a t e d for at least a p o r t i o n of their e x t e n s i v e 
l o s s e s * And, for the reasons set forth in Arguments VIII 
through X above, the court should r e v e r s e the j u d g m e n t of 
the d i s t r i c t court and remand with i n s t r u c t i o n s to enter 
judgment in favor of the Richins Parties. 
R e s p e c t f u l l y submitted this Jt? day of A p r i l , 
1988. 
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